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17.5: Appendix C- Human Behavioral Ecology - The Evolution of Cooperation

  • Page ID
    142410
    • Nicole Herzog and Kristin Snopkowski
    • Explorations

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    Prisoner’s Dilemma icon by Christopher X Jon Jensen (CXJJensen) & Greg Riestenberg is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 International.
    • Authors: Herzog, Nicole; Snopkowski, Kristin
    • Format: In-person or online
    • Modified from: The Game of Trust www.ncase.me/trust
    • Time needed: 75 minutes

    Learning Objectives

    • Define the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
    • Identify the most successful strategy in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game and an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game
    • Identify factors that can break down cooperation or trust
    • Explain how the Prisoner’s Dilemma game can help us understand human food sharing

    Supplies Needed

    • Internet access
    • Worksheet (provided)

    Readings

    • Snopkowski, Kristin. 2009. Appendix C: Human Behavioral Ecology. Explorations.

    Introduction

    The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a hypothetical game where two players have the option to cooperate with each other or cheat, without knowing what the other player will do. It is based on a situation where two people are arrested for a crime (hence: prisoner’s dilemma). If they both keep silent, meaning that they do not tell the police what they did and cooperate with their partner, each gets limited jail time (let’s say, one year). But if one cheats, by telling the police, and the other one cooperates, by staying silent, then the one who cheats does not go to jail and the one who cooperates gets a long sentence (let’s say, three years). If both players cheat, by telling the police, then both individuals do a moderate sentence (two years). This game has been used extensively to understand when individuals will cooperate and when they will cheat. In this lab, we will use the prisoner’s dilemma game (also known as the Game of Trust) to understand which strategies (cheating or cooperating) are best, given particular circumstances, providing insights into the evolution of cooperation. After playing the game, students reflect on how this helps us understand human food sharing behavior.

    Game theory is defined as the study of the ways in which interactions among players produce outcomes. In this case, students play the Game of Trust. Their payoffs are in terms of coins. Each student is represented by the player on the left (the character with the red hat) and they play with a ‘computer player’. If the student cooperates and the computer player cheats, the student loses a coin. If both cooperate, the student earns two coins. If the student cheats and the computer player cooperates, the student earns three coins. If they both cheat, the student earns zero. If the student plays the game once, it’s known as a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game.

    Steps

    1. Students navigate to: www.ncase.me/trust. It is best if each student has their own device to play.
    2. Let students know that there is a set of circles on the bottom of the screen, if students need to move to another part of the game, they can use the circles to move quickly to the end or beginning of the game. They won’t be marked down for their choices of play in the game. They will only be evaluated based on their answers to the accompanying questions.
    3. Distribute the worksheet and tell students to read the instructions step-by-step as they play and then answer the questions in order.
    4. After they play, discuss the reflection questions and make connections with how this game can help understand human food sharing.

    Reflection Questions

    While the Prisoner’s Dilemma game was not designed to explain food sharing, we can use the game to help us understand the dynamics of trust and cooperation as they relate to decisions about resource sharing within small-scale societies.

    1. Thinking about the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which factors would you expect to see in a population that engages in extensive food sharing?
    2. Which factors are we unable to account for in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and how might that limit its application to the problem of food sharing?

    Adapting for Online Learning

    Rank how adaptable to online learning it would be: ​​​​​​​ Easy to adapt

    For Further Exploration

    References

    1. Henrich, Natalie; Henrich, Joseph, 2007. Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press Inc.
    2. Snopkowski, Kristin. 2019. “Appendix C: Human Behavioral Ecology”. Explorations: An Open Invitation to Biological Anthropology, edited by Beth Shook, Katie Nelson, Kelsie Aguilera, and Lara Braff. Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association. http://explorations.americananthro.org/
    3. Tomaselloby, Michael; Dweck, Carol. 2009. Why We Cooperate. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

    Acknowledgement

    Thanks to Nicky Case for developing The Game of Trust interactive website.


    This page titled 17.5: Appendix C- Human Behavioral Ecology - The Evolution of Cooperation is shared under a CC BY-NC 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Nicole Herzog and Kristin Snopkowski via source content that was edited to the style and standards of the LibreTexts platform.