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8.6: Interest Groups and Democracy

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    287296
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    The Founders were wary of the power organized groups could wield in a democratic political system. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison cautioned against “the mischiefs of faction,” by which he meant a group of people with shared interests distinct from the interests of the society as a whole. If a faction were to prevail, policies would be made for its benefit rather than for the benefit of all. Happily, Madison argued, the Constitution was well-designed to prevent these mischiefs: minority factions would naturally lose out in a democracy thanks to majority rule, and majority factions (if any managed to form in such a large and diverse country) would be thwarted by the Constitution’s various safeguards, such as separation of powers and checks and balances.

    Madison’s view of factions reflects a belief in pluralism, the theory that democracy is ultimately a competition among interest groups to determine government policy. From a pluralist perspective, rather than leaving each individual citizen to attempt to influence politics with his or her vote in isolation, interest groups act as intermediaries between citizens and government, giving voice to their needs and wants in a way they would struggle to do for themselves. This competition makes for slow policymaking — because groups are fighting against one another to move policy in opposite directions — but larger groups or coalitions of groups should, in theory, win out in the long run due to the majoritarian nature of democracy.

    Photograph of a portion of a roadmap published by the American Automobile Association in 1918 for its members
    For over a century, AAA members have enjoyed automobile-related selective incentives — such as this roadmap from 1918 — for paying their dues to the organization.

    In reality, America’s political system doesn’t always deliver majoritarian outcomes when it comes to interest groups. The richer someone is, the more money he or she can give to interest groups; the more money an interest group has, the more influence it can wield. Moreover, minorities that strongly support policies have an edge over majorities that weakly oppose them. For example, many policies in the United States provide subsidies to certain industries using taxpayer dollars. These subsidies raise the prices of goods like gasoline and breakfast cereal, but not by enough for most Americans to notice or care about the additional cost. The recipients of these subsidies, on the other hand, benefit massively from them, and are therefore highly motivated to preserve them.

    Under certain conditions, an interest group can informally unite with a congressional committee or subcommittee and a bureaucratic agency to form an iron triangle. Iron triangles coalesce around a policy status quo that each corner benefits from maintaining. The interest group provides electoral support to members of the congressional committee or subcommittee in return for favorable legislative activity related to their interests. The interest group also lobbies Congress on behalf of the bureaucratic agency — often requesting ample funding for the agency — in exchange for the agency imposing lax regulations on them. Meanwhile, the congressional committee or subcommittee directs support (monetary or otherwise) to the bureaucratic agency in exchange for the agency implementing its legislation in particular ways. A sufficiently powerful iron triangle can maintain policies indefinitely without majority public support, often without the public even becoming aware of what’s happening.

    The nonmajoritarian aspects of interest group politics are one reason why March for Our Lives — like many other efforts to strengthen gun control laws — fell short of its goals despite majority support for them. The families and friends of the victims of the Parkland tragedy may never fully recover from that fateful day, but the truth is that for most Americans it was just another Wednesday, and their lives would have been much the same had the shooting never happened. Millions of Americans are sympathetic to the cause of stricter gun control, but motivating them to act on an issue that is unlikely to affect them personally is incredibly difficult. The National Rifle Association, one of the leading gun-rights organizations in the United States, occupies a minority position in the gun control debate, but it represents a class of people (gun owners) who are personally invested in the issue of gun control and willing to pay to contribute to defend their interests. The NRA’s many selective incentives for members provide additional reasons for them to contribute to the group’s efforts.


    8.6: Interest Groups and Democracy is shared under a not declared license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by LibreTexts.

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