“In class background and political proclivity, the justices (and federal judges at other levels) have more commonly identified with the landed interests than with the landless, the slave owners rather than the slaves, the industrialists rather than the workers, the exponents of Herbert Spencer rather than of Karl Marx.”
–Michael Parenti (1)
It is clear from previous chapters that the Supreme Court—indeed, the federal judiciary broadly—is a political actor and that we are currently in a period in which the composition of the federal courts is a highly politicized issue. There is strong evidence, for example, that Court votes have increasingly split between justices appointed by Republican versus Democratic presidents. (2) In this chapter, we want to see if we can make some generalizations about the Supreme Court as an ideological actor. Litigants who come before the Court represent particular interests, and it would be helpful for us to know which interests tend to win before the Court more often that other interests. Those patterns reveal the Court’s fairly clear ideological tenor illustrated by Parenti’s quote above, although we can certainly identify exceptions to the rule.
As this might be your first but, hopefully, not only political science course, you might be confused by the terms used to describe political ideologies. There’s a good reason for that: they’re confusing! American ideologies are, as a group of legal scholars wrote, “imperfectly overlapping.” (3) Nevertheless, we can try to group ideological terminology in somewhat coherent ways. The terms associated with the two predominant ideologies in America group together like this:
The terms conservatism, neo-liberalism, classical liberalism, and cultural conservatism all hang together even though those group’s adherents don’t necessarily agree with each other. For example, a cultural conservative might want to ban all forms of what they would call pornography, but neo-liberals don’t get up in the morning wanting to ban pornography. And classical liberals would positively recoil at a government powerful enough to dictate what materials adults could access. We should also keep in mind that the impulses of cultural conservatism, neo-liberalism, and classical liberalism can coexist inside the head of an individual conservative. Humans are complicated. Nevertheless, for our purposes here, we are going to refer to the people in this entire category as conservatives and lump all of these impulses together under the conservatism label.
The terms liberalism, progressivism, social-welfare liberalism, and democratic-socialism all hang together even though those group’s adherents don’t necessarily agree with each other. For example, there is a fairly strong wing of liberals who have no interest in promoting the kind of single-payer healthcare system that really gets progressives and democratic-socialists excited. In fact, many on the left side of this grouping would say that what they call corporate or Wall Street liberals are really just conservatives. Just as with conservatism, individuals on the U.S. political spectrum’s left side can have liberal, progressive, and democratic-socialist impulses coexisting in their brains at the same time. For our purposes here, we are going to refer to people in this entire category as progressives and the ideology as progressivism. We should be clear, though, that this large tent of people includes democratic socialists but does not include true socialists whose aim is to dismantle capitalism.
Conservatism and Progressivism
If there is one thing that unites conservatives, it is defending existing privilege and power. Hierarchy—or a “chain of subordination,” as Edmund Burke famously put it when criticizing the French Revolution—is very important to conservatives. Conservative defenses of monarchy gave way in the wake of the French Revolution to a more principled set of arguments that adapted to the particular set of privileges and power that conservatives sought to defend. Conservatives believe that some people are fit to rule others in the political sphere as well as private spheres of families, farms, factories, and offices. Political scientist Corey Robin nicely summarizes conservatism’s primary aim: “Conservatism is the theoretical voice of . . . animus against the agency of the subordinate classes. It provides the most consistent and profound argument as to why the lower orders should not be allowed to exercise their independent will, why they should not be allowed to govern themselves or the polity. Submission is their first duty, and agency the prerogative of the elite.” (4) What does this mean in practice? Conservatives opposed granting women and minorities the right to vote; they opposed civil rights legislation designed to protect people from discrimination; they oppose workers’ ability to organize; they oppose women’s ability to control their bodies; they oppose corporation and bank regulations; they oppose national health insurance that would empower people vis a vis their employers; they oppose campaign finance regulations and disclosure laws; they support expanding police power in poor neighborhoods while limiting it for white-collar criminals. As the demands of progressive movements have changed over time, conservatism has risen to defend the prerogatives of those who stood to lose power or privilege.
If there is one thing that unites progressives, it is the belief in using government power to help people live full lives, solve social problems, and counter business interests’ power. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, progressives have made the case that the traditional political rights of voting, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, free speech, etc. only guarantee negative freedom—freedom from government intrusion—and that they ought to be supplemented by positive social and economic rights. If we can guarantee people freedom of speech, can’t we also guarantee them health care, adequate housing, and a living wage? In 1945, Franklin Roosevelt gave his last state of the union speech in which he called for a Second Bill of Rights that would have guaranteed employment with a living wage, adequate housing, medical care, social security, and a good education. Some of those provisions have been enacted at either the federal or state level, but others have not. In addition to the Social Security system, the United States added programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, subsidized school meals, taxpayer-financed public education, and a variety of social welfare programs aimed at providing people a safety net. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, it became increasingly clear to many progressives that most people had less to fear from government tyranny than they did from corporate predation. Large corporations are able to control peoples’ social and economic lives to a great extent. Progressive critics argue that corporations distort democracy in many ways. Finally, progressives have been at the forefront of ensuring equal rights for people regardless of race, sex, national origin, and religion.
The Historical Behavior of the Supreme Court
Given this quick background in political ideologies, what conclusions can we reach about the Supreme Court as an ideological actor? Perhaps the best thing for us to do is to review the Court’s actions over the course of American history with an eye toward the ideological distinctions made above. The Supreme Court’s history shows that it fits firmly in the conservative ideological tradition, although it has at times acted progressively on issues such as civil rights and the rights of the accused.
Let’s look at three specific areas:
The Supreme Court as Enforcer of Corporate Hegemony
The Court reveals its ideological character most strongly in its friendship to corporate America at the expense of working people. Even though corporations are not mentioned in the Constitution, the Court has worked hard to ensure that corporate prerogatives are enshrined in the law of the land and woven throughout the very core of daily life. States began chartering corporations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As early as 1819, the Court recognized that a corporate charter—in this case one granted by the King of England before there was a United States—constituted a contract that states could not revoke or even change. (5) After adopting the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 with its protections for the life, liberty, property, due process and equal protection of the laws for “persons,” the Court moved quickly to break down the long-established distinction between artificial persons—i.e., corporations and other organizations allowed to exist by state charter—and natural persons—actual living, breathing human beings. The railroad companies led the charge and the Court complied: even before argument had been heard, Chief Justice Waite announced that “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.” (6) In fact, there was no legal precedent for erasing the distinction between artificial and natural persons, and it was clear from the congressional deliberations over the Fourteenth Amendment that senators and representatives were not thinking about corporations when they wrote it. (7)
Thus unleashed, corporations were able to use federal and state courts to thwart democratic control, as courts struck down child labor laws, maximum hours laws, and a bevy of regulations designed to make working life bearable. For instance, the Supreme Court has ruled several times that corporate rights under the Fourth Amendment prevent authorities from random and unannounced inspections. This makes it rather difficult to enforce environmental, safety, or health regulations. (8) Similarly, corporate commercial speech has become extremely difficult to regulate because of the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment in favor of corporations. The Court has, for example, forbidden conservation laws that banned electric utilities from promoting electricity use and has stricken down laws requiring that advertised health claims be backed up by scientific evidence. (9) The Court has ruled in the Citizens United case (2010) that the First Amendment means that corporations can spend unlimited amounts of money on “electioneering communication.” And finally, the Hobby Lobby case (2014) allowed for-profit corporations the right to exercise religious freedoms that are protected by the First Amendment. Enabled by an earlier hijacking of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections for “persons,” Harvard Law School professor John Coates, IV, comments in a broader historical and political context on the Court using the First Amendment to empower corporations:
“The corporate takeover of the First Amendment represents a pure redistribution of power over law with no efficiency gain. . . That power is taken from ordinary individuals with identities and interests as voters, owners and employees, and transferred to corporate bureaucrats pursuing narrowly framed goals with other people’s money. This is as radical a break from Anglo-American business and legal traditions as one could find in U.S. history.” (10)
Before we leave the issue of the Court’s privileging corporations in the American social hierarchy, we should pause to note the Court’s antipathy to workers’ interests. In Lochner v. New York (1906), the Court struck down state laws limiting the hours that employers could force employees to work, saying it was a violation of the freedom of contract. As we noted before, the Court came around after Roosevelt’s court-packing plan to endorse many regulations. However, in the modern era, justices have been on a spree when it comes to privileging corporations over their workers. They undercut public service unions in 2018 by forbidding them from making all employees pay fees to defray the costs of negotiating agreements with corporations, even if all the employees are covered by those wage and working condition agreements. (11) Beginning in the late 1960s, businesses became more aggressive about pushing cases to the Supreme Court. Republican appointed justices are more pro-business than Democratic appointees, but even Democratic appointees have become more pro-business over time. Additionally, the proportion of pro-business Supreme Court decisions roughly tripled from the late 1960s to the early 2000s. (12) According to one recent analysis, over several years the Court ruled in a pro-business fashion between 57 percent and 81 percent of the time. (13)
The Supreme Court and Democratic Governance
Robert Kaplan, the former legal affairs editor for Newsweek, argues forcefully that America’s continual deference to “nine unaccountable judges” constitutes “a disdain for democracy.” (14) Kaplan is correct, even though the Court occasionally acts to uphold democratic principles. For instance, the Court famously struck down legislative districts that were grossly unequal in population as a violation of the one-man, one-vote principle. (15) If you live in a district with 30,000 voters, and I live in one with 100,000 voters, your vote for representative is more determinative of who wins than is mine, and your representative has fewer constituents to represent. To its credit, the Court disallowed such disparities. The Court also applied that principle when striking down conservative efforts to count only eligible voters for the purposes of drawing legislative boundaries. The Constitution is clear that legislative districts are based on the number of persons, not eligible voters. (16) not eligible voters. (16)
Still, the Court has acted in remarkably undemocratic ways at key moments in American history. The Court has, in the words of constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, “enforce[ed] the Constitution against the will of the majority” when it should be protecting “the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political process and. . .uphold[ing] the Constitution in the face of any repressive desires of political majorities.” The Court has, says Chemerinsky, “often failed where and when it has been most needed.” (17) Let’s quickly review three prominent examples:
Partisan Gerrymandering—We’ll talk in more detail about gerrymandering in a later section on electoral politics. Basically, it refers to willfully drawing district boundaries to achieve a political end. The Court has ruled that drawing such boundaries to disadvantage a particular race is unconstitutional because it violates the one-man, one-vote principle in a way that exhibits racial animus. (18) But there are other forms of gerrymandering. Once geo-mapping and big data technology became easily available to state parties and legislators, they used these technologies to engage in partisan gerrymandering, which is when the majority party in a state draws legislative districts to make it difficult for the opposition party to win seats in the state legislature or U.S. House of Representatives. As we’ll see later, such practices are obviously unfair assaults on the very nature of American democracy. However, the conservative majority on the Supreme Court declined to do anything about partisan gerrymandering, even when the results effectively disenfranchise millions of American voters. The majority said the issue was a “political question” for state legislatures to resolve. (19) Of course, it is primarily majority parties in state legislatures that are causing the problem, so the Court’s decision amounts to giving a pass to this particular anti-democratic practice.
The 2000 Presidential Election—Bush v. Gore (2000) illustrates the Court majority’s animus toward democracy and its willingness to set aside its own precedents when given a chance to hand the presidency to their preferred Republican candidate who was lagging behind in both the popular and electoral college vote. On election night, it was clear that Democrat Al Gore was ahead of Republican George W. Bush in the national popular vote as well as the electoral college vote. In Florida, however, Bush was ahead by .061 of 1 percent in the initial vote tally. As per state law, Gore asked for a recount. Florida’s Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, who was also Bush’s state campaign manager, abused her office by trying to shut down the recount. The Florida Supreme Court ordered the recount to continue. The U.S. Supreme Court, at Bush’s request, stepped into the case while Harris refused to extend deadlines for recounts, and the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission certified Bush as the winner with 537 more votes than Gore. On Friday, December 8, the Florida Supreme Court again ruled in Gore’s favor and ordered Florida’s Supervisor of Elections and the Canvassing Board to continue with manual vote recounts.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in Bush v. Gore on December 7 and then again on December 11. In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided along ideological lines to overturn the Florida Supreme Court’s actions. Specifically, the Court said that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision failed to specify how all counties should do the recount and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, even though the Florida Supreme Court had designated a single judge to hear all disputes, thus guaranteeing a single standard. Even worse, the majority opinion specifically said that the U.S. Supreme Court’s particular interpretation of the equal protection clause was a one-off and should not be precedent setting. As the dissenting justices mentioned, the solution to the Court’s ruling was simply to remand the case back to the Florida State Supreme Court and ask it to establish clear standards for the recount. Instead, the conservatives on the U.S. Supreme Court stopped the recount altogether, thus handing a 537 vote margin and the Florida victory to Bush, which allowed him to squeak by in the electoral college by one vote.
Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, who does not believe the five conservative justices acted in a partisan way, nevertheless puts Bush v Gore “among the worst decisions in history.” The Court stepped into a case that “it had no business hearing and deciding.” For one thing, there was an established state process for resolving the issue, and the Court should never have taken the case. For another, the Court assumed prematurely that Bush had already suffered a wrong that it could address, when in fact it was unknown whether Bush or Gore would have prevailed in the recount. (20)
The Voting Rights Act—One section of the Voting Rights Act that was originally passed in 1965 required that states with a documented history of voting discrimination—mostly Southern states that had worked overtime for nearly a century to deny voting rights to African Americans—receive “preclearance” from the Justice Department or the United States District Court in Washington, DC, before implementing changes to their election laws. The purpose of preclearance was to ensure that states would not revert to election practices that overtly discriminated or that had discriminatory effects. The Voting Rights Act has been tremendously successful. In 1956, black turnout was about fifty percentage points below that for whites, whereas now, voting rates are roughly equal for both whites and blacks. Further, in 1965, there were only about 1,000 African Americans in elected office around the country, whereas by 2015, that number surpassed 10,000 office holders. (21)
In 2006, Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act, including the preclearance provision, for an additional twenty-five years. It passed unanimously in the Senate and with only thirty-three “nay” votes in the House. Between 1982 and 2006, the Justice Department had blocked over 700 voting changes, which is an indication that the preclearance states were still inclined to pass discriminatory voting practices. (22) Shelby County, Alabama, sued the U.S. Attorney General, arguing that the preclearance provision was unconstitutional. In a 5-4 decision, the conservative justices on the Court agreed with Shelby County in Shelby County v. Holder (2013) and said that the preclearance provision was out of date and unconstitutional. Combined with the Court’s disinterest in the negative effects of restrictive state voting laws, Shelby County has signaled that the Court will allow a variety of attempts to reduce the number of minorities, college students, and poor people from exercising their voting privileges. A study by the Brennan Center for Justice found that states that had previously been required to preclear their voting law changes, purged voters off their election rolls at a significantly higher rate than other states in the wake of the Shelby County decision. (23) In 2016, for the first time in twenty years, the black voter-turnout rate dropped in a presidential election. (24)
During the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, the Court repeatedly acted to make it more difficult for people to vote. In the Wisconsin primary that year, the conservative majority blocked a lower court order that extended the period to return absentee ballots. This forced voters to stand in long lines during a pandemic to ensure that their votes counted. The conservative majority also blocked a lower court order in Alabama that would have made it easier for Alabamians to use absentee ballots rather than stand in lines. And the Court refused to hear a challenge to a Texas law that makes it easy for older voters to use absentee ballots, but not those under the age of 65. (25)
The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Women and Racial Minorities
Through much of its history, the exclusively white and male Supreme Court justices (up until Thurgood Marshall joined the court in 1967) acted as though a key part of their charge was to maintain a social order in which women and people of color were relegated to second class status. It has only been through progressive changes in the law and the evolution of social norms that the Court was forced to embrace civil rights. Even then, the Court appears ever ready to look for opportunities to restrict the full emancipation of women and people of color.
From the beginning of the American republic until the 1950s, the Supreme Court acted as a strong enforcer of white supremacy. The Court held that people of African descent were “beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race” and that the rights of white people were not intended to apply to black people. (26) It overturned the civil rights conviction of white men who killed African Americans. (27) The justices sanctioned segregation and discrimination on the part of hotels, restaurants, theaters, and other private businesses that served the public. (28) The Court upheld state laws banning interracial marriage. (29) The Court sanctioned state-mandated train segregation, which then applied to all sorts of public facilities like public schools and swimming pools. (30) This animus was not restricted to African Americans: the justices endorsed local authorities as they prevented a Chinese American girl from attending her local whites-only school. (31) The Court allowed the federal government to detain and put Japanese Americans into camps, absent any individual or collective evidence that Japanese Americans posed a security threat during World War II. (32)
Beginning in the 1950s, the Court began to support equal rights for racial and ethnic minorities. This change was caused and reinforced by societal changes and strong civil rights laws that Congress managed to pass over the objections of Southern Democrats. We’ll talk more about those laws and court cases when we get to the text’s civil rights section. Suffice it to say that society forced the Court to end segregated education, segregated housing, bans on interracial marriages, voter discrimination, and employment discrimination based on race and ethnicity. However, as recently as Abbott v. Perez (2018), the Court upheld as legal a redistricting scheme that a lower court had determined was drawn to disenfranchise black and Hispanic citizens. And in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute (2018), the Court upheld a state voter purge law that had a disproportionate impact on people of color.
Interestingly, the Court needed to play less of a role enforcing gender hierarchy than it did for white supremacy for the simple reason that women’s second-class citizenship was so taken for granted that women had difficulty pushing their issues to the highest court. Note that women’s constitutional right to vote came fifty years after it did for black men. Justices ruled 8-1 in 1873 that Illinois did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection or privileges and immunities clauses when it would not allow women to be licensed to practice law. The Illinois court ruling that the Supreme Court upheld, said this: “That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth.” (33) The Court allowed states to place limits on women’s working hours when the Court, three years previously, had not allowed such limits on men’s working hours. (34) The justices sanctioned the forced sterilization of women deemed to be mentally disabled. (35)
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Court was finally forced to confront women as equals to men within the context of civil rights laws and changing social norms. To its credit, the Court endorsed access to contraception for both married and unmarried couples as well. (36) The Court legalized abortion on a progressively more restrictive trimester basis in its Roe v. Wade (1973) decision, but the conservative majority has been working steadily since then to allow states to place restrictions on a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. The Court made it illegal to post job announcements that specified gender requirements. (37) It ruled that sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. (38)
We can say with a fair degree of confidence that since the 1950s, with respect to race, and since the 1960s, with respect to sex, the Supreme Court has been forced by collective action and shifting societal norms to redeem itself. Only the public’s vigilance with respect to federal statutes and a keen eye toward the kinds of justices that get appointed to the Court will ensure that the Court acts to uphold ordinary Americans’ rights. Absent that vigilance, empowered elites will be inclined to push the Court to its historical pattern, which legal scholar Ian Millhiser so deftly summarizes:
“The justices. . .have routinely committed two complementary sins against the Constitution. They’ve embraced extra-constitutional limits on the government’s ability to protect the most vulnerable Americans, while simultaneously refusing to enforce rights that are explicitly enshrined in the Constitution’s text. And they paved a trail of misery as a result. Few institutions have inflicted greater suffering on more Americans than the Supreme Court of the United States.” (39)
In this sense, the Court has primarily acted as a conservative force in America, using its power to enforce a hierarchy in which the subordinated classes have difficulty achieving agency.
What if . . . ?
What if the Supreme Court were a force for democracy and agency among ordinary people? What would be required for that to happen? Changes in the language of the Constitution? Changes in the kinds of people sitting on the Supreme Court? A revitalization of the importance of the Constitution’s preamble in the adjudication of disputes?
- Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few, 9thedition. Boston: Wadsworth, 2011. Pages 249-250.
- Lee Epstein and Eric Posner, “If the Supreme Court is Nakedly Political, Can it be Just?” New York Times. July 9, 2018.
- Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, “How Business Fares in the Supreme Court.” Minnesota Law Review. 97:1431. April 16, 2013. Page 1433
- Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump. 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pages 7-8.
- Dartmouth College v. Woodward(1819).
- Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company(1886). Justice Waite quoted in William Myers, The Santa Clara Blues: Corporate Personhood Versus Democracy. III Publishing, 2000. Page 6.
- Adam Winkler, We the Corporations:How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2018.
- William Myers, The Santa Clara Blues: Corporate Personhood Versus Democracy. III Publishing, 2000. Page 6. Refer to See v. City of Seattle(1967) and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.(1978).
- Just two of many examples: Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v. Public Service Commission of New York(1980) and POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. (2014).
- John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications. February 27, 2015. Page 31. Pdf available here.
- Janus v. AFSCME(2018).
- Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, “How Business Fares in the Supreme Court.” Minnesota Law Review. 97:1431. April 16, 2013.
- Adam Feldman, “The Big Business Court,” Empirical SCOTUS. August 8, 2018.
- David A. Kaplan, The Most Dangerous Branch. Inside the Supreme Court’s Assault on the Constitution. New York: Crown, 2018.
- Reynolds v. Sims(1964).
- Evenwel v. Abbott(2016). Richard Wolf, “Supreme Court Upholds ‘One-Person, One-Vote,’” USA Today. April 4, 2016.
- Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court. New York: Viking, 2014. Pages 9-11.
- We should note, however, that the Court sometimes sets the bar very high when it comes to cases of racial gerrymandering. In Abbott v. Perez(2018) the Court upheld as legal a redistricting scheme that a lower court had established was drawn to disenfranchise black and Hispanic citizens.
- Ariane de Vogue and Devan Cole, “Supreme Court Allows Severe Partisan Gerrymandering to Continue,” CNN. June 27, 2019.
- Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court. New York: Viking, 2014. Pages 234-249.
- Niraj Chokshi, “Where Black Voters Stand 50 Years After the Voting Rights Act was Passed,” The Washington Post. March 3, 2015.
- James D. Zirin, Supremely Partisan. How Raw Politics Tips the Scales in the United States Supreme Court. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. Page 176.
- Kevin Morris, Myrna Perez, Jonathan Brater, and Christopher Deluzio, “Purges: A Growing Threat to the Right to Vote,” The Brennan Center for Justice. July 20, 2018. See also Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute (2018)
- Jens Manuel Krogstad and Mark Hugo Lopez, “Black Voter Turnout Fell in 2016, Even as a Record Number of Americans Cast Ballots,” The Pew Research Center. May 12, 2017.
- Ian Millhiser, “The Supreme Court Just Handed Down Dome Truly Awful News for Voting Rights,” Vox. July 3, 2020. Josh Gerstein, “Liberals Recoil at SCOTUS’ Wisconsin Primary Decision,” Politico. April 7, 2020.
- Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857)
- United States v. Cruikshank (1876)
- The Civil Rights Cases (1883)
- Pace v. Alabama (1883)
- Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
- Lum v. Rice (1927)
- Korematsu v. United States (1944)
- Bradwell v. State of Illinois (1873)
- Muller v. Oregon (1908)
- Buck v. Bell (1927)
- Griswold v. Connecticut(1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)
- Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on HumanRelations (1973)
- Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson(1986)
- Ian Millhiser, Injustices: The Supreme Court’s History of Comforting the Comfortable and Afflicting the Afflicted. New York: Nation Books, 2015. Page xiii.