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8.4: Diagnosing Vulnerability and Preventing State Failure

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    76766
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    Nowhere is this more important than in relation to the development of appropriate mechanisms for ensuring the security of individuals and groups, of appropriate forms of ‘community governance’ and of effective machinery for the peaceful settlement of individual and collective grievances. These issues are normally assumed to be the preserve of the State (at both local and national government levels). In many conflict zones, however, state systems fail in their duty of care and are a primary source of insecurity for citizens. They are incapable of delivering security, order, predictability and essential services such as education and health. Far from creating environments, therefore, within which robust markets can emerge, the state system is often a primary source of predation and an impediment to economic growth or what might be called ‘affluent subsistence.’

    This has given rise to the ‘Fragile, Failed and Failing State’ literature which focuses attention on the problems that generate failed and failing states, e.g rampant corruption, predatory elites, an absence of the rule of law and severe ethnic and religious divisions. The fragile state literature argues that there will be no development without security and there will be no security without strong and legitimate state systems capable of imposing their will on potentially recalcitrant citizens (Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, 2007).

    The solution to vulnerability, therefore, is often seen as the development of an effective military, police and penal capacity as the first and most pressing imperative confronting modern state systems. The Failed and Failing State perspective has been quite influential with policy makers in the last five years with the result that much attention has been dedicated to enhancing state effectiveness (normally seen in terms of the state’s monopoly of force and coercive capacity) so that state systems can dominate and control their populations and territory, in order to reduce their vulnerability to and capacity to do violence to each other.

    While the diagnosis might be correct, the prescriptions thus far have not been particularly successful and in some instances have enhanced the repressive capacities of the state without increasing the security of citizens. These initiatives have by and large reasserted the centrality of a strong state system based on classic ‘Westphalian principles’ in the absence of either the historic, economic or geographical conditions that make such systems possible. They have emphasised respect for the sovereign equality of nation states externally without, in many instances, a corresponding respect for the dignity and basic rights of all people within the state. A good case could be made that much of this literature has focused too much attention on state entitlements without paying the same attention to state responsibilities both internally and externally.

    Ashraf Ghani and others (2005) have responded to some of these criticisms in their analysis of what they call the sovereignty gap. This refers to the incapacity of many states in the developing world to protect citizens and to extend basic services to the whole population. Ghani et al, reiterate the mantra that most developing states have limited internal accountability and responsibility and do not possess a monopoly of force. Their solutions, however, still direct most attention toward the approach of enhancing ‘good’ governance and the central functions of the state in the hope that this will generate the conditions within which development can take place. ‘Trickle down’ will only occur once development assistance has ‘trickled up’ to reinforce central state functions! They propose that the underlying concept of the State remains some variation on the European OECD model, without much practical appreciation of other non-state sources of order, stability and development. In fact it is somewhat surprising how little of this literature considers state-civil society relationships and more surprising still how almost no-one considers the relationships between state systems, civil society and customary orders. It is simply assumed that if state systems can be made capable, effective and legitimate they will fulfill something akin to the traditional Weberian functions of the state.

    The challenge facing policy makers is not so much the goals of state capability, effectiveness and legitimacy as what constitutes appropriate means to achieve these ends. My argument here is that until customary norms, values and institutions are taken seriously and incorporated directly into state building dynamics and vice versa these goals will remain elusive.

    OECD style states are in the minority rather than a majority within the United Nations. Most states in developing parts of the world, and particularly within much of Africa and in Oceania represent what can be called hybrid political orders. The locus of much social order and effective governance in these states resides in non-state forms of customary rule rather than in government institutions. This does not mean that these states should be regarded as ‘incomplete,’ or ‘not yet’ properly built, or ‘already’ failed. Rather than thinking in terms of fragile states, it is theoretically more appropriate and practically more fruitful to think in terms of hybrid political orders. Instead of assuming that the complete adoption of western state models is the most appropriate avenue for conflict prevention, security, development and good governance, therefore, it might be more appropriate to focus on models of governance which draw on the strengths of social order and resilience embedded in community life. Without wishing to idealise custom and tradition I hypothesize that this hybrid model holds particularly true for societies in Africa and the Pacific. Hybrid models which genuinely blend or combine traditional and modern norms and practices are more likely to deliver effective, functioning and legitimate governance precisely because they build on the hybridity and multiplicities of existing political orders. This is not to imply that they will always or consistently generate such governance. It is possible for hybrid political orders to generate insecurity, be predatory and patrimonial as well, in which case hybrid forms will have negative rather than positive consequences. In the main, however, I would argue that hybrid models—in post-colonial environments—have a better chance of generating capable and effective governance than non-hybrid models.


    8.4: Diagnosing Vulnerability and Preventing State Failure is shared under a CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by LibreTexts.

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