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13.9: Sovereignty, Security or Sentiment? Solving Transnational Crime

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    77177
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    We can see that part of the problem in trying to tackle transnational crime derives from the principles of conduct underpinning the international system. Those principles sometimes limit effective international co-operation among states. They include the territorial sovereignty and limited jurisdiction of states and the narrow self-interests of states that define their domestic priorities. International measures and cooperation to protect the human security of the victims of transnational crime will not be forthcoming if they threaten a state’s national security and interests. Even if such international agreements are reached they may be weakened or limited by the states themselves – resulting in agreements that provide for ad hoc non-binding commitments that lack the funding necessary to establish monitoring mechanisms or agencies responsible for the problem, that fail to set timetables or targets, and that fail to generate public interest in the issue through an acquiescent media industry.

    A further normative problem is the framing of transnational crime as a security issue threatening the state, rather than as an issue affecting the security of human beings. For example, the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), established by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2002, is emerging as an action-oriented security actor. While the rapid evolution of an APEC security regime is drawing APEC members into an ever-deeper series of counter-terrorism commitments, it has not been fully welcomed by all ASEAN members. Disagreements among APEC members over the legitimacy and wisdom of a security role for APEC are emerging and creating a fault-line within the organisation. Whereas Singapore and Thailand have welcomed US-led initiatives within a counter-terrorism context, officials from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam have openly expressed reservations, arguing that they do not wish to be associated with the US “War on Terror”, which is widely regarded amongst their populations as anti-Muslim, unilateral, pre-emptive, and disproportionately military.

    More effective action against transnational crime could be achieved if instead it were seen as a criminal issue threatening the human security of individuals. This would require individual nations to criminalize all types of transnational crime in their own domestic criminal codes as well as to sign bilateral agreements, extradition treaties, and mutual legal assistance treaties with other nations to ensure that law enforcement officials have the authority to investigate and prosecute these activities as criminal offences. For example, while many Southeast Asian countries have bilateral extradition treaties with the United States, only a few have signed them with each other. The situation is even worse in some countries where the rule of law and the legal system is weak or only partially applied. Myanmar, Cambodia and, to some extent, Vietnam are states where the legal system is undermined by a lack of democratic representation, corruption, and domestic struggles for power. Such states are therefore ideal environments for transnational criminal groups. For example, the United Wa State Army operates with impunity in Northeast Myanmar and is estimated to control 80 per cent of the opium and heroin trade in the country (Emmers 2010). If states fail to criminalize transnational crime at a national level, it becomes much more difficult to create or enforce regional or international efforts to address such activity.

    Beyond international, regional, and national responses important contributions are made by the efforts of well-resourced Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. For example in 2007, NGOs, together with the UN, launched The Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking. This was the 200th anniversary of the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade (UN, 2007). In essence NGOs are attempting to change and shape the global norms (guiding values) concerning transnational crime. A combination of religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, faith in progress, compassion, and moral conscience helped eliminate the slave trade of the 19th century. A similar set of ethical values motivate NGOs to persuade states to address modern transnational crimes such as human trafficking or the ivory trade. NGOs work towards establishing a moral consensus by states and societies that all peoples, irrespective of their nationality, gender, age, race, or religion, or other defining characteristics, are entitled to the basic protections ensuring their human security (Nadelmann, 1990).


    13.9: Sovereignty, Security or Sentiment? Solving Transnational Crime is shared under a CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by LibreTexts.

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