9.1: Breaking Up is Hard to Do
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It's Getting Weird
There is a recurring problem with conversations about globalization: we keep trying to decide whether it is on or off.
A factory relocates and globalization is winning. A tariff appears and globalization is dying. International trade increases and borders supposedly matter less. A government restricts migration and suddenly nationalism is back. A company announces that it will manufacture closer to home and commentators announce “deglobalization,” only to discover that the company's suppliers still stretch across six countries.
Reality is considerably messier.
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
The Aug. 26 version of this chapter was onto something when it called its opening section “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do.” The title works because the global economy has spent decades building relationships that are remarkably difficult to unwind.
Consider something as seemingly national as a car assembled in the United States, Germany, Mexico, South Korea, or Japan. Its components may include semiconductors designed in one country, fabricated in another, machinery made elsewhere, minerals extracted on another continent, software developed by internationally dispersed teams, financing moving through global capital markets, and intellectual property governed by treaties negotiated years earlier.
“Made in” has become a surprisingly complicated phrase.
Richard Baldwin (2016) describes contemporary globalization as increasingly organized around international production networks rather than simple exchanges of finished products between national economies. Production itself has been sliced apart geographically. That makes separation expensive, because governments and companies are not merely deciding whether to trade with one another; they are trying to untangle systems that evolved through decades of investment, specialization, infrastructure, regulation, and habit.
This does not mean those systems cannot change.
They already are.
From Efficiency to Security
For much of the late twentieth century, firms were encouraged to organize production around a relatively simple logic: find the combination of locations, workers, suppliers, regulations, and transportation systems that would produce goods efficiently and cheaply.
Then reality started interrupting the spreadsheet.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerabilities of highly concentrated supply chains. Semiconductor shortages halted production far beyond the electronics industry. Russia's invasion of Ukraine disrupted energy and food markets. U.S.-China competition transformed chips, batteries, telecommunications equipment, and critical minerals into questions of national security. Governments that once celebrated the efficiency of geographically dispersed production began worrying about whether they could obtain essential goods during a crisis.
The language changed accordingly.
Policymakers increasingly spoke of reshoring, moving production back home; nearshoring, relocating production closer to major markets; and friend-shoring, shifting supply chains toward countries considered politically reliable partners.
None of these developments means that international production disappears.
They mean that governments and firms are reconsidering which international relationships they are willing to depend on.
That distinction matters.
The WTO's 2026 assessment finds evidence that trade between geopolitical blocs has grown more slowly than trade within them, with renewed fragmentation particularly visible amid intensified U.S.-China tensions (WTO, 2026). Yet the same evidence does not describe a world retreating neatly into self-contained national economies. Instead, trade routes are being redirected, alliances reconsidered, suppliers diversified, and production networks rearranged.
Globalization is not necessarily shrinking.
It may be changing its map.
Slowbalization, Fragmentation, and the Trouble with Labels
Economist Adjiedj Bakas popularized the term slowbalization, later developed in broader debates about the slowdown of some forms of economic integration following the hyperglobalization of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The idea is useful because globalization does not need to reverse completely in order to change significantly.
Other scholars use geoeconomic fragmentation to describe a world in which economic relationships are increasingly shaped by strategic rivalry, sanctions, security concerns, and political alliances.
Those concepts capture something that the simple word deglobalization often misses.
Imagine two countries that continue trading billions of dollars in goods while simultaneously restricting each other's technology companies, subsidizing competing domestic industries, imposing export controls, screening foreign investment, and building alternative supply networks.
Are they globalizing?
Deglobalizing?
Both?
Welcome to Global Studies.
Borders Matter. Just Not Equally.
One of the oldest clichés about globalization is that borders are disappearing.
They aren't.
The more interesting question is what crosses them easily.
Money can sometimes travel around the planet in seconds. Digital content can circulate almost instantaneously. A multinational corporation may shift investment from one country to another with relative ease. A person fleeing conflict, however, may encounter walls, visa systems, biometric databases, asylum restrictions, detention centers, or a passport that dramatically limits where they are legally permitted to go.
The border did not vanish.
It became selective.
That pattern should sound familiar because we have encountered it repeatedly throughout this book. Globalization increases mobility, but it distributes mobility unevenly. It produces connection, but not symmetrical power. It creates global markets while allowing profoundly different labor protections, environmental regulations, wages, and citizenship rights to exist inside them.
The result is not a flat world.
It is a deeply connected one whose pathways have very different gates.
Nationalism Never Actually Left
Globalization theory sometimes created the impression that national identity would gradually fade as markets, travel, media, and communication connected societies more closely.
Instead, globalization has frequently generated powerful nationalist reactions.
That is not necessarily contradictory.
The more societies experience economic restructuring, migration, cultural change, technological disruption, and declining confidence in institutions, the more political actors may mobilize narratives promising control, sovereignty, security, or national restoration. Political scientist Dani Rodrik (2011) famously argued that deep economic globalization can generate tensions among national sovereignty, democratic politics, and international economic integration because societies cannot always maximize all three simultaneously.
That tension remains remarkably relevant.
People may enjoy imported products while opposing trade agreements. Businesses may depend on migrant workers while political movements demand tighter immigration controls. Governments may encourage foreign investment while portraying foreign economic influence as threatening. Voters can want the benefits of interdependence without accepting all of its consequences.
Humans, as it turns out, are extremely capable of holding several contradictory ideas before breakfast.
Globalization Has Always Been Political
Another reason claims about the “death of globalization” can be misleading is that they sometimes treat globalization as though it were a natural force, like gravity, rather than something constructed through rules.
But supply chains do not spontaneously appear.
Governments negotiate trade agreements. International institutions establish standards. Corporations decide where to invest. States construct visa systems. Courts enforce contracts. Central banks influence financial flows. Infrastructure determines which regions connect to markets. Labor laws shape working conditions. Intellectual-property rules determine who controls technologies and knowledge.
Globalization has therefore never been simply about movement.
It has been about the governance of movement.
Once we recognize that, an important possibility appears.
If globalization was constructed through political choices, institutional arrangements, struggles over power, and historical circumstances, then its future is not predetermined either.
It can be redesigned.
Which brings us to a movement whose argument was never simply “stop globalization.”
Its argument was much more inconvenient:
What if we globalized differently?


