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9.3: Welcome to the Geopolitical Remix

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    Deglobalization, Regionalization, and a Multipolar World

    For much of the post-Cold War period, the dominant story about globalization was surprisingly linear. Markets would integrate, institutions would deepen, democracies would spread, technology would compress distance, and the world, while still unequal and conflict-ridden, would gradually become more interconnected under a broadly shared set of rules.

    That story now looks much less tidy.

    The international system is becoming more fragmented at the same time that many forms of interdependence remain stubbornly intact. The United States and China are strategic competitors whose economies are still deeply entangled. European governments talk about “de-risking” rather than full economic separation because complete disengagement would be enormously costly. India participates in the Quad while maintaining ties with Russia and asserting its own strategic autonomy. Gulf states deepen economic relationships with China while sustaining security ties with the United States. Middle powers increasingly resist the idea that they must fit neatly into someone else’s camp.

    This is not the return of a simple Cold War.

    It is messier than that.

    From One Center to Several

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars frequently described the international system as unipolar, with the United States occupying an unusually dominant position in military, economic, technological, and institutional power (Wohlforth, 1999). That dominance never meant that the United States controlled everything, but it did help structure many of the institutions, norms, and economic arrangements that shaped the early decades of contemporary globalization.

    Today, however, global power is more dispersed.

    China has become indispensable to global manufacturing, trade, finance, infrastructure investment, and technology. India’s demographic and economic weight has expanded rapidly, while Brazil, Türkiye, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, and other states increasingly seek influence beyond the traditional centers of global governance. Russia remains a major military and energy power despite significant economic constraints. The European Union continues to exercise enormous regulatory and market power even when its member states disagree politically.

    The result is not a world in which one power simply replaces another.

    It is a world in which multiple states and coalitions increasingly possess enough economic, political, military, demographic, technological, or regional influence to complicate any single hierarchy.

    That is what scholars mean when they talk about multipolarity.

    The term is useful, but it can also obscure as much as it reveals. Power does not come in one neat package. A state may possess extraordinary military capabilities while remaining dependent on foreign technology. Another may wield enormous influence through finance or manufacturing without dominating global security institutions. A smaller country may lack traditional geopolitical weight yet control minerals, shipping routes, energy supplies, data infrastructure, or diplomatic access that becomes disproportionately important during moments of crisis.

    Global power is therefore becoming not merely more dispersed, but more issue-specific.

    BRICS and the Politics of Not Asking Permission

    One visible expression of this shifting landscape is the expansion of BRICS, the grouping originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The coalition has grown beyond its original membership and increasingly presents itself as a platform for states seeking greater influence within, or alternatives to, institutions long dominated by Europe and the United States.

    It would be easy to interpret BRICS as simply an anti-Western bloc.

    That would be a mistake.

    Its members differ sharply in political systems, strategic priorities, economic structures, regional ambitions, and relationships with the United States and Europe. India and China, for example, cooperate within BRICS while simultaneously managing a serious geopolitical rivalry. Gulf states may pursue BRICS relationships without abandoning longstanding Western partnerships. Brazil has often emphasized reform of global governance rather than wholesale rejection of the existing international order.

    What holds such coalitions together is therefore not necessarily ideological unity.

    It is often dissatisfaction with the distribution of voice and authority in global institutions.

    That grievance has a long history. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were created in a very different distribution of global power, and debates over voting shares, leadership traditions, lending conditions, and representation have persisted for decades. Demands for reform are therefore not simply symbolic. They reflect a broader question that has followed this entire book:

    Who gets to write the rules when the world that created those rules has changed?

    Regionalization: Globalization With Neighborhoods

    Another plausible future is not deglobalization at all, but regionalization.

    Instead of one increasingly integrated global economy, we may see denser economic and political networks forming within regions. North American production has become deeply integrated through the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The European Union remains one of the most sophisticated regional integration projects in history. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Continental Free Trade Area, Mercosur, and other regional institutions reflect efforts to expand trade, coordination, mobility, or political leverage among neighboring states.

    Regionalization can make practical sense. Geographic proximity reduces transportation costs. Neighboring states often share infrastructure, migration systems, environmental problems, energy grids, security concerns, and commercial ties. Governments seeking to reduce vulnerability may prefer supply chains that remain international but are geographically closer or politically easier to manage.

    Yet regional integration does not automatically produce equality.

    Economic activity may concentrate in already prosperous urban corridors. Smaller economies may become dependent on larger neighbors. Environmental costs may be shifted toward less powerful communities. Migrants may cross borders to fill labor shortages while remaining politically marginalized. Corporations may move production within a region precisely because wage and regulatory differences persist.

    A region can be integrated and unequal at the same time.

    You have probably noticed by now that this book refuses to let anything stay simple for very long.

    The Global South Is Not One Thing

    Discussions of multipolarity often rely heavily on the phrase Global South, but the term requires care.

    It is useful because it highlights historical inequalities embedded in colonialism, development, finance, trade, and global governance. It also captures real efforts among countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere to coordinate around issues such as climate finance, development rights, debt, intellectual property, and institutional reform.

    But “the Global South” is not a unified political actor.

    Its states have profoundly different interests.

    Oil exporters and climate-vulnerable island states may both belong to the Global South while approaching energy politics very differently. Middle-income industrial powers do not occupy the same economic position as low-income states burdened by debt. Countries competing for regional influence may cooperate in one forum while opposing each other elsewhere. Some governments possess considerable bargaining power in global markets; others have very little.

    The phrase therefore works best as an analytical category, not as shorthand for political unity.

    Once again, scale matters.

    Middle Powers and the Art of Strategic Ambiguity

    One of the most interesting developments in the emerging global order is the growing importance of states that do not dominate the international system but possess enough economic, diplomatic, technological, military, or geographic importance to shape outcomes.

    These middle powers often pursue multiple relationships simultaneously.

    They may buy weapons from one country, accept infrastructure financing from another, sign trade agreements with a third, participate in regional organizations, and cooperate with rivals on climate negotiations or maritime security. What can look inconsistent from the outside may actually be a strategy designed to preserve autonomy.

    Political scientists sometimes describe this behavior as hedging: states avoid committing completely to one side while maintaining relationships that reduce dependence and maximize room for maneuver.

    This matters because much popular commentary still describes world politics as though every country is lining up behind Washington or Beijing.

    Many are not.

    They are negotiating.

    And that negotiation itself is power.

    Supply Chains Have Become Foreign Policy

    The geopolitical remix is perhaps most visible in places that once seemed almost aggressively boring: semiconductor factories, shipping routes, battery minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, fiber-optic cables, and ports.

    Governments now regularly discuss supply chains using the language of national security.

    Advanced semiconductors sit at the center of artificial intelligence, telecommunications, consumer electronics, automobiles, and military technology. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and rare-earth elements are critical to batteries, renewable-energy systems, and advanced manufacturing. Undersea cables carry the overwhelming majority of international digital traffic. Major ports and shipping corridors can become strategic vulnerabilities when conflict, accident, climate disruption, or political pressure interrupts them.

    The map of globalization is therefore increasingly also a map of strategic dependence.

    A country that controls a crucial input does not need to dominate the entire international system to possess leverage.

    This is one reason the future is likely to involve not merely competition for territory, but competition over infrastructure, standards, data, minerals, finance, logistics, and technological ecosystems.

    The geopolitics of the twenty-first century may sometimes look less like armies facing one another across a border and more like a fight over who gets to manufacture the chips.

    Less cinematic.

    Potentially just as consequential.

    Three Futures Can Be Happening at Once

     

    Types of political fragmentation.
    Figure \(\PageIndex{1}\): The Geopolitical Remix. Contemporary globalization can fragment along some dimensions, regionalize along others, and remain deeply interconnected at the same time. Source: Author-created through prompt generation using ChatGpTt, CC BY 4.0.

    Figure \(\PageIndex{1}\): The image above provides a visualization of the three dimensions of globalization surrounding a globe, fragmentation shown on the left of the globe witth sanctions, export controls, and strategic rivalry, regionalization shown on the right of the globe with regional trade, nearshoring, and new alliances, and continued interdependence at the bottom of the globe covering supply chains, finance, energy, and technology. 

    This brings us back to the central problem of the chapter.

    Is globalization ending?

    The evidence gives us a frustrating answer.

    Not exactly.

    Some relationships are fragmenting. Others are deepening. Some production is moving closer to final markets. New trade routes are emerging. States are protecting strategic industries while simultaneously pursuing international investment. Regional institutions are strengthening. Rival powers are competing while continuing to depend on each other economically.

    Several futures are arriving at once.

    That is precisely why the next question cannot simply be whether globalization survives.

    The more important question is what kinds of global systems emerge from the rearrangement, and who has enough power to shape them.

    Because while governments are busy redrawing economic and geopolitical relationships, another transformation is moving even faster.

    It does not require a passport.

    It does not wait for a trade agreement.

    And it is already changing how millions of people work, learn, communicate, create, and compete.


    This page titled 9.3: Welcome to the Geopolitical Remix was last modified on Fri, 11 Sep 2026 22:53:49 GMT and is shared under a CC BY-NC 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Miloni Gandhi.