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3.3: Theories of Persuasion

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    Again, persuasion theories are general, scientifically acceptable principles that attempt to explain persuasion. Persuasion theories are not how-to's or strategies.

    There are many theories related to persuasion. Many of these theories were developed in the discipline of communication studies, while others come from other disciplines, such as psychology, behavioral psychology, behavioral economics, and others. The list of theories below is by no means exhaustive, but represents prevalent theories on the subject.

    Balance Theory - 1946

    Heider’s Balance Theory in psychology proposes that people strive for cognitive consistency in their attitudes and perceptions, particularly in triadic (groups of three) interpersonal relationships. "It suggests that when there’s an imbalance (e.g., a person likes another person who dislikes something they like), there’s a motivational drive to restore balance, either by changing attitudes or perceptions" (Guy-Evans).

    "If no balanced state exists, then forces toward this state will arise (Heider, "Attitudes" 107). Let's say I love metal music and I really like a person, but this person does not like metal music. This can create a sense of imbalance that I might be compelled to change. I could do this in several ways: I could change how I feel about the person and decide to like them less or not at all because they're not a metalhead. I could also engage in some of what Heider called "cognitive reorganization." I could reorganize my way of thinking so that I believe that this person not liking my kind of music simply isn't that big of a deal. Heider noted that, "If a change is not possible, the state of imbalance will produce tension" ("Attitudes" 107).

    For instance, if looking at two individual’s attitudes toward going to the gym:

    If you like someone and you both like going to the gym, you have a balanced relationship. If you like someone and neither of you like going to the gym, you have a balanced relationship. If you like someone and you like going to the gym but they don't like going to the gym, an imbalanced relationship exists. Due to the psychological discomfort of this unbalanced relationship, you might be be more likely to change your attitude towards going to the gym due to liking this person (Guy-Evans).

    Aronson and Cope conducted research which supported the following result: "We like someone who likes someone that we like; we like someone who dislikes someone we dislike; we dislike someone who likes someone we dislike; and we dislike someone who dislikes someone we like. This follows even though it is clear that the respective reasons for liking or disliking the target person are unrelated (12).

    The implication for balance theory in persuasion is that, if an imbalance is perceived, people may be compelled to change their attitudes or behaviors in order to restore balance.

    Yale Attitude Change Approach - 1953

    Why_We_Fight_title.jpg

    During World War II, the U.S. War Department created a series of training films entitled "Why We Fight." The Armed Forces created this series to quickly and effectively indoctrinate the mass influx of drafted soldiers and help them understand the events that led up to U.S. participation in the war (Baronne). Yale professor and researcher Carl Hovland was brought in to determine if the film series was effective as a means of communicating information and creating lasting change in opinion and attitude (Lumsdaine 198). By the end of the war, Hovland and his team of researchers had conducted nearly 200 studies involving more than half a million soldiers from the Army and Navy. This research focused largely upon opinion control and the affect of media upon public opinion (Baronne).

    Upon returning to Yale after the war, Hovland founded the Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program, which "coordinated systematic research on variables determining the effects of persuasive communication" (Hovland et al. 2). Out of this work came a model called the Yale attitude change approach, which describes the conditions under which people tend to change their attitudes. Hovland demonstrated that certain features of the source of a persuasive message, the content of the message, and the characteristics of the audience will influence the persuasiveness of a message (Hovland, et al. 13-14).

    This framework of source, message and audience characteristics as drivers of persuasion largely directed decades of persuasion research. Source characteristics such as speaker credibility, attractiveness, expertise and trustworthiness; message characteristics such as subtlety, sidedness, and timing; and audience characteristics such as intelligence, self-esteem, age, are discussed at greater length elsewhere in this book.

    Cognitive Dissonance Theory - 1957

    When we are hungry, we feel uncomfortable. Our stomachs rumble, we may feel irritable or shaky, we may have low energy. We become very much aware that we need to eat, and we are motivated to find food!

    Cognitive dissonance is akin to being hungry. Cognitive dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable, just like hunger is physically uncomfortable. Whereas a lack of food causes hunger, inconsistency in our thinking causes cognitive dissonance, or psychological discomfort. Whereas hunger motivates us to find food, cognitive dissonance motivates us to reduce or prevent the psychological discomfort.

    In 1957, Leon Festinger described cognitive dissonance as a drive-like state of discomfort resulting from psychological inconsistencies in people’s thinking which motivates efforts to reduce or prevent the discomfort (qtd. in de Vries 1). A common example of cognitive dissonance relates to smoking. People know smoking can cause lung cancer, yet many continue to smoke, which may cause guilt, embarrassment, defensiveness, or some other form of psychological discomfort. According to cognitive dissonance theory, people are highly motivated – whether they realize it or not – to resolve or stop this discomfort. How could a person resolve the inconsistency between their smoking and the health risk? Some might quit smoking. Some might convince themselves that they don't smoke enough to cause harm. Some might tell themselves that they will quit after one more cigarette. All of these folks have reduced or prevented their mental discomfort.

    Although a lot of examples of cognitive dissonance focus on ways people rationalize or justify negative choices or mistakes, cognitive dissonance can also motivate people to engage in positive behaviors and make positive changes. When dissonance occurs, people are primed to adjust their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to reduce the dissonance/discomfort and restore psychological balance. This has major implications for persuasion.

    Inoculation Theory - 1961

    At the core of inoculation theory is a biological metaphor (Compton). Much like our bodies can be inoculated against viral attacks, our attitudes can be inoculated against persuasive attempts. The theory's originator, William McGuire, contended that "by exposing individuals to a persuasive message that contains weakened arguments against an established attitude, individuals would develop resistance against stronger, future persuasive attacks (Compton). McGuire believed that people tended to defend their beliefs by avoiding exposure to counterarguments rather than by developing positive support for their beliefs. In essence, this selective exposure weakened their "immune systems", making people highly vulnerable to strong counterarguments when exposed (McGuire 184).

    So how can we avoid selective exposure and strengthen our beliefs? Both threat and refutational preemption can reduce selective exposure.

    Threat refers to recognition by message recipients that their existing position on an issue is vulnerable; it functions as a motivating force for a protective response. One type of threat is forewarning; a direct, explicit warning that one's position on a topic is susceptible to change. Refutational preemption “provides specific content that receivers can employ to strengthen attitudes against subsequent change” (Pfau et. al 188). A typical inoculation message forewarns the audience of impending challenges to their held position, then raises the challenges and counterarguments that opponents might articulate, and then refutes those counterarguments.

    Social Judgment Theory - 1961

    Muzafer Sherif and Carl Hovland presented their social judgment theory in the 1961 book, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change. Social judgment theory "seeks to specify the conditions under which [attitude] change takes place and predict the direction and extent of the attitude change, while attempting to explain how likely a person might be to change their opinion, the probable direction of that change, their tolerance toward the opinion of others, and their level of commitment to their position" (Mallard 197).

    Social judgment theory is an attempt to predict attitude change and the conditions under which it will take place (Rand 6). Integral to this theory are the concepts of latitude of acceptance, latitude of rejection, and latitude of non-commitment. Rand explains: "The latitude of acceptance is a range of positions including the most acceptable position and other acceptable positions. Similarly the latitude of rejection is a range of positions which include the most objectionable position plus other objectionable positions. The latitude of non-commitment consists of those positions on an issue which are not responded to by the individual as either acceptable or objectionable" (Rand 5-6).

    Take, for example, your personal attitude towards artificial intelligence (AI). If you are a big fan of AI, you have a pro-AI position and AI is very much within your latitude of acceptance, as are messages that are supportive of or in favor of AI. Messages that denigrate or disfavor AI would be in your latitude of rejection. A message that neither accepts nor rejects AI, such as, "AI is not a replacement for creativity," would likely fall in your latitude of non-commitment.

    Social judgment theory specifies that the individual will change in the direction of a communication only when the communication falls within their initial latitude of acceptance. Thus, social judgment theory would predict that with small discrepancies between the initial position of the individual and the position advocated in a communication, the greater the probability that it will fall within their latitude of acceptance and thereby create some position change. The greater the discrepancy between the individual's initial position and advocated position the greater the probability that it will fall into the latitude of rejection" (Rand 6-7).

    Sherif contended that the more ego-involved a person is in an issue, that is, the more important that issue is to a person, the less susceptible they are to changing their position (Rand 9).

    Based upon this theory that people will change only if a message falls within their latitude of acceptance on an issue, what strategy might a persuader employ to effect attitude change?

    Psychological Reactance Theory - 1966

    Have you ever walked by a "Don't Walk on the Grass" sign and then immediately stepped on the grass? Or started a diet and found yourself eating an entire family-size bag of potato chips? Although many persuasive messages and campaigns are successful, sometimes these messages result in audience members adopting opposite behaviors. When a person is presented with a persuasive message and then adopts the opposite stance, a "boomerang effect" occurs. A theoretical framework that helps us understand these oppositional reactions is Brehm's psychological reactance theory.

    Brehm states: "people become motivationally aroused by a threat to or elimination of a behavioral freedom. This motivational state is what is called psychological reactance. It impels the individual to restore the particular freedom that was threatened or taken away. It does not impel the individual to acquire just any freedom—only the one threatened or taken away will do" (Brehm 72). So if a doctor advises a patient to stop smoking, and the patient feels that their freedom to smoke is being threatened or taken away, the patient may very well light up the second they leave the doctor's office!

    "Reactance is an unpleasant motivational arousal that emerges when people experience a threat to or loss of their free behaviors" (Steindl et al. 205). "People who are threatened usually feel uncomfortable, hostile, aggressive, and angry" (Steindl et al. 205). Threatened people may exhibit a range of behavioral and cognitive reactions, such as engaging in the restricted behavior, counterarguing, denigrating the source of the threat, to generally acting out in hostile or aggressive ways.

    So what, exactly, triggers this reactance? Forceful, dogmatic, and triggering language – language designed to stifle the receiver's freedom to maintain an opinion – tends to elicit reactance (Quick and Stephenson 256). Triggering words include such terms as "should", "ought", "must" and "need". People are typically energized to act in ways that will restore their freedom when their values are affected (Steindl 207). Culture appears to play a role in reactance. Jonas et. al found that individualists or people with an independent self-construct are more likely to exhibit reactance when their individual, personal freedom is threatened, whereas collectivists or people with an interdependent self-construct are more affected by threats to their collective freedom (1078).

    Although reactance is often associated with undesirable outcomes such as anger and opposition, reactance can produce desirable outcomes. Reactance can elicit heightened achievement motivation, and recent studies show that reactance can activate positive affect, such as feeling strong, determined, and capable of changing an unpleasant situation (Steindl et. al 210-211).

    Theory of Reasoned Action - 1967 / Theory of Planned Behavior - 1985

    According to the theory of reasoned action, the most important predictor of behavior is behavioral intention (Montaño and Kasprzyk 98). If one has no intention of keeping up with the readings for a class, the chances of that person reading the class materials are very, very slim. If one has every intention of keeping up with the reading, something might still prevent them from doing so, but their chances of reading the class materials are much higher because of their behavioral intention. So where does intention come from?

    According to the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior, the three direct determinants of our behavior intentions are our behavioral beliefs, our normative beliefs, and our perceived control over the behavior (Fishbein and Azjen 20; Montaño and Kasprzyk 98).

    The theory of reasoned action, which later expanded into the theory of planned behavior, assumes that human behavior follows the beliefs that people have about that behavior. Beliefs guide the decision to perform or not perform the behavior in question (Fishbein and Azjen 20). These theories distinguish three types of belief about behavior. Behavioral beliefs are about the positive or negative consequences a person might experience if they performed the behavior. If a person believes that a positive outcome will result, the theory of reasoned action posits that the person will have a positive attitude about that behavior. Normative beliefs are about perceived social pressure. Do important people and groups in one's life approve or disapprove of a behavior, and do these people engage in this behavior themselves? If one's important referent groups approve of a behavior and practice it themselves, TRA holds that people will feel pressure to perform this behavior. If one's important people disapprove of the behavior and do not engage in it, they will perceive pressure not to perform this behavior (Fishbein and Azjen 20-21).

    Going back to the example of keeping up with the reading in a class: does keeping up with the reading have positive or negative consequences? If one believes the the consequences would be positive, TRA forwards the idea that they will have a positive attitude about that behavior. Do the people one looks up to approve of keeping up with course work? Would they engage in this behavior themselves? If so, TRA argues that this normative belief creates social pressure to engage in this behavior.

    The theory of reasoned action was expanded to the theory of planned behavior with an additional determinant of intention: control beliefs.Control beliefs are about personal and environmental factors that can help or impede peoples' attempts to carry out the behavior (Fishbein and Azjen 21). If one believes that reading class material is beneficial and feels positive social pressure to keep up with the readings, but perceives a very busy work and school schedule to be an impediment, this influences one's intentions to perform the behavior.

    "In combination, attitude toward the behavior, perceived norm, and perception of behavioral control lead to the formation of a behavioral intention, or a readiness to perform the behavior. As a general rule, the more favorable the attitude and perceived norm, and the greater the perceived behavioral control, the stronger should be the person’s intention to perform the behavior in question" (Fishbein and Azjen 21).

    Elaboration Likelihood Model - 1980

    Petty and Cacioppo’s elaboration likelihood model originally set out to understand how individuals use information to arrive at judgments in persuasive situations (Trumbo 397). ELM asserts that when one encounters some form of communication, this information is processed with varying degrees of thought. "When conditions foster people's motivation and ability to engage in issue-relevant thinking, the elaboration likelihood is said to be high" (Petty and Cacioppo, "Elaboration" 673). The elaboration likelihood model contends that, when a high degree of thought or mental elaboration is being used to process information, a central route is being used, whereas when a low degree of thought or elaboration is being employed, a peripheral route is being used.

    The central route is associated with a person’s motivation and ability to think: therefore, effort, reasoning and mental energy are at play. High elaboration means that people "attend to the appeal; attempt to access relevant associations, images, and experiences from memory; scrutinize and elaborate upon the externally provided message arguments in light of the associations available from memory; draw inferences about the merits of the arguments for a recommendation based upon their analyses of the data extracted from the appeal and accessed from memory; and consequently derive an overall evaluation of, or attitude toward, the recommendation" (Petty and Cacioppo, "Elaboration" 673). The peripheral route, on the other hand, is associated with the message recipient having little motivation or ability to process a message. In the elaboration likelihood model, the peripheral route relies on association with positive or negative cues, which have no intrinsic link to the persuasive message, such as source attractiveness or number of arguments (Petty and Cacioppo, "Elaboration" 673). In short, the central route relies upon the processing of and engagement with information; the peripheral route relies upon cues, associations, or simple inferences.

    Research has demonstrated that the quality of the arguments contained in a message has a greater impact on persuasion under conditions of high than low issue involvement . Conversely, peripheral cues such as the expertise or attractiveness of the communicator have a greater impact on persuasion under conditions of low involvement. People who are not engaged in an issue will be influenced by the simple number of arguments. People who are highly engaged with an issue and believe the persuasive appeal is important are influenced by the quality of the arguments (Petty and Cacioppo, "Elaboration" 674).

    Essentially, research supports that the elaboration likelihood model, which focuses upon the manner in which people relate persuasive appeals to their prior knowledge, predicts one's ability to achieve susceptibility or resistance to persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, "Elaboration" 674). When elaboration likelihood is low, experts are more persuasive than non-experts, and celebrities are more persuasive than average citizens (Petty and Cacioppo, "Source" 669). When elaboration likelihood is moderate, "characteristics of the message source [e.g., physical attractiveness, background, prestigious hobbies, etc.] can help a person decide whether or not the message is worth considering" (Petty and Cacioppo, "Source" 670).

    Heuristic-Systemic Model - 1980

    Another dual-processing model of attitude change is the heuristic-systematic model. The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion asserts that systematic processing is defined by effortful scrutiny and comparison of information; systematic processing involves attempts to thoroughly understand any available information through careful attention, deep thinking, and intensive reasoning (Chaiken and Ledgerwood 246). Heuristic processing, on the other hand, is defined by the use of cues to arrive more easily at a judgment. These cues, or “simple decision rules” manifest as agreement with expert opinion, a tendency to agree with perceived social consensus, or a willingness to rely on currently held information. This mode requires less effort and fewer resources than systematic processing (Trumbo 392). In this model, heuristics, or indicators, such as consensus (“everyone is doing it”); expertise (“experts know what they’re talking about") or argument length ("a long argument is a strong argument”) tend to influence opinions and attitudes (Chen and Chaiken 75)

    Two principles proposed by the systematic-heuristic processing theory are the least effort principle and the sufficiency principle. The least effort principle reflects the assumption that individuals try to arrive at attitudinal decisions as efficiently as possible; the sufficiency principle "asserts that individuals are sometimes motivated to exert additional cognitive effort in order to reach a certain level of judgmental confidence" (Chaiken and Ledgerwood 247).

    Considerable research relating to this model supports the claim that individuals will process information heuristically unless they are both motivated and able to engage in more effortful systematic processing. Ultimately, as ability and motivation increase, systematic processing plays an increasing role in influencing attitudes (Chaiken and Ledgerwood 253).

    Narrative Paradigm - 1984

    "A good story is more convincing that a good argument." - Walter Fisher

    Once upon a time–1984, to be precise–a USC professor named Walter Fisher published a provocative article. At that time, you see, most communication scholars viewed rhetoric as practical reasoning. "Formal, rational modes of argument should be the measure of effective persuasion," said the Establishment. But Professor Fisher politely disagreed. "Reasoning need not be bound to argumentative prose or be expressed in clear-cut inferential or implicative structures," he said (Fisher, "Narrative" 1).

    Whereas most of us would describe humans as homo sapiens, or wise humans, Professor Fisher very much viewed humans as homo narrans: storytelling humans. He believed that when it comes to human nature or what is means to be human, storytelling is as important, possibly more so, than language or reasoning. "Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as they are reasoning animals," said the professor (Fisher, "Toward" 376).

    "So what is this 'narrative" you promote?" asked the Establishment. Fisher explained that narration is "a theory of symbolic actions–words and/or deeds–that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them." He saw the narrative paradigm as bringing together the argumentative, persuasive theme and the literary, aesthetic theme (Fisher, "Narrative" 2). Fisher people accepted or reject the “truthfulness” of competing stories. His innovative work explored how individuals consider whether or not stories cohere and hold together internally according to cultural understanding – an idea he named narrative probability – and whether or not a story seems true given other stories people hear, experience and come to believe – a principal he named narrative fidelity. "These may be thought of as tests that we apply – whether instinctively or through conscious reasoning – to decide whether a narrative coheres and offers good reasons for action and belief. A message that is judged by a particular audience to be high in narrative probability and narrative fidelity enhances identification and is more likely to be adopted or adhered to by members of that audience" (Engebretsen and Baker).

    The Unimodel - 1999

    In 1980, both the elaboration likelihood model and the systemic-heuristic model appeared in persuasion scholarship. Both models put forward the idea that persuasive messages are processed in two ways; either by effortful (central or systemic) processing or by less effortful (peripheral or heuristic) processing. Nearly two decades later, Kruglanski and Thompson challenged this idea, and argued that "the function fulfilled by cues and heuristics and message arguments is essentially the same" (93). In other words, it does not matter whether persuasive messages are peripheral/central or heuristic/systemic, all serve as forms of evidence and are therefore functionally equivalent (Kruglanski and Thompson 93). All persuasive messages, despite their characteristics, serve as evidence for the evaluative inferences perceivers draw (104).

    According to the unimodel, central processing isn’t qualitatively different from peripheral processing (Gass and Seiter 47). El Hidhli and Zourrigb posit that the main contention of the unimodel is that individuals, in a persuasion context, seek to reach conclusions based on pieces of information within the persuasive message (436).  They further state that the unimodel rejects the idea that there is a qualitative distinction (such as peripheral vs. central) in the "route" of persuasion; all persuasive material is simply used by the receiver as evidence to draw message-related conclusions (436). Ultimately, the unimodel contends that all messages, regardless of type, serve as evidence for attitude change.

    Nudge Theory - 2008

    When I was a child, my family had one trash can. Everything - garbage, glass, aluminum cans, food waste, yard waste - went into the same can. Now, when we go out for fast food or walk into a membership warehouse or walk on to campus, we see several kinds of waste cans: some for compost, some for recycling, some for garbage, and sometimes even special receptacles for batteries or light bulbs. When we sort our waste into the correct bin, we are being what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein would call "nudged."

    What, exactly is a nudge? It is "any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 13). No one is forcing us to sort our garbage, nor rewarding us if we do, nor fining us if we don't. We tend to do the right thing because the "right" choice has been made available to us, typically without fanfare or even our knowledge.

    Nudge theory comes from the field of behavioral economics, and co-founder of nudge theory Richard Thaler won the 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to behavioral economics.

    At its heart, nudge theory is what Thaler and Sunstein call "libertarian paternalism", which they define as “… an approach that preserves freedom of choice but authorizes both private and public institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare” ("Libertarian Paternalism" 175). The paternalism comes in where Thaler and Sunstein posit that "it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better” (Nudge 5). The hallmark of libertarianism is individual choice: "people should be free to do what they like - and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so" (Nudge 5). In short, nudge theory is the idea that governments, systems, leaders, and organizations can arrange choices - a concept they call "choice architecture" - for the betterment of society. Freedom of choice is preserved, but people's behavior has been influenced by how the information is presented.

    Common examples of nudges include everything from default settings on our phones, to product placement on store shelves, to push notifications/reminders, to website design, to automatic savings plans. These nudges tend to be subtle and we have free choice to resist or opt out of the nudge.

    More Theories Related to Persuasion

    Although this chapter has addressed eleven of the most popular theories relating to persuasion, there are several others that attempt to explain mechanisms that lead to changes in beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors. These include:

    • unimodel theory of persuasion
    • functional attitude theory
    • attribution theory of persuasion
    • social learning theory
    • language expectancy theory
    • ACE model of persuasion