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19.3: How do the two meta-theories that focus on the organism differ from each other?

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    9373
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    As depicted in Figure 8.1, two meta-theories, namely Maturational and Organismic, fall to the extreme right of the figure, indicating that both of them are “big O” meta-theories that assign a primary role to the person in shaping development. How then, do these two meta-theories, which both prioritize the organism, differ from each other? First, as shown by the difference in their positions in Figure 8.1, Organismic meta-theories assume a relatively greater role for environments than do Maturational meta-theories. The importance of the environment is visible, for example, in Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. According to this perspective, the contents of logico-mathematical thinking, such as conceptions of time and causality, have specific universal properties because they are constructed based on interactions with objects that are governed by the specific universal laws of physics; it is likely that the contents of development would be completely different if humans were to construct their schemas and logical operations on planets where these laws did not apply. In such a radically different environment, the basic organismic processes of adaptation, assimilation, accommodation, (dis)equilibration, and (re)organization, would lead to very different developmental outcomes.

    A second set of differences between Maturational and Organismic meta-theories are listed in Figure 8.2. Because Maturational meta-theories assume that biology and genetics are running the show, they do not view humans as active or agentic in their own development. (No act of will can force a tulip bulb to produce an iris.) It may seem confusing to argue that Maturational meta-theories assume that people are passive and reactive, when all the developmental action seems to be located right there inside the person. However, the director of this action is the person’s biology—their genes and neurophysiology—over which the person does not exert direct control.

    To borrow another metaphor, in Maturational meta-theories, the person (or more precisely, the agentic self) is not in the driver’s seat. The pickup truck of development is driven by the genetic program. The person him or herself is in the passenger’s seat, just along for the ride. What about theories focused on personal attributes that seem closer to the agentic self, like those that concentrate on brain systems, personality traits, or intellectual abilities? Some of these theories can be considered Maturational—if they assume that these characteristics are fixed or immutable—and thus not open to influence from the agentic self. In contrast, one of the most notable features of Organismic meta-theories are their assumptions about human nature—they assume that people are active, curious, goal-directed agentic beings.

    A second difference between Maturational and Organismic meta-theories centers of the issue of continuity versus discontinuity. Because Maturational meta-theories assume biological priority and immutability of personal characteristics—this implies two kinds of continuity in development. On the one hand, it is assumed that there is great stability in people, based on their fixed biopsychological attributes. Attributes that were seen in newborns should continue to be apparent in young children, older children, adolescents, and adults. On the other hand, explanatory continuity is also assumed because development can be fully understood by investigating an individual’s biology. The search for causes of development privileges the territory covered by genetics and neurophysiology.

    In contrast, a distinctive feature of Organismic meta-theories is their assumption of discontinuity. They assume descriptive discontinuity, because development is seen as the emergence of a series of qualitatively new reorganizations. They also assume explanatory discontinuity, because each successive reorganization is built on the unique configuration of the previous level of development, in combination with new ingredients and activities. As a result, no developmental step can be reduced to any previous steps.