4.5: Democratic Backsliding and Authoritarian Resilience

How Democracies Die Slowly

Contrary to Cold-War coups, today’s autocrats erode democracy from the inside. They capture courts, rewrite constitutions, and weaponize disinformation while claiming to defend “the people.” Some examples include:

• Hungary’s Viktor Orbán coined “illiberal democracy,” centralizing power under the banner of national culture (Bogaards, 2018).

• Poland’s Law and Justice Party weakened judicial independence through legal reforms (Sadurski, 2019).

• Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro used social media to delegitimize electoral oversight.

• United States (2016–2021) saw record polarization, disinformation campaigns, and challenges to electoral legitimacy (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

These patterns exemplify what Nancy Bermeo (2016) terms “executive aggrandizement”: slow institutional capture rather than sudden rupture.

For much of the late twentieth century, democracy appeared to be the dominant global trajectory. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of elections across Latin America and Eastern Europe, and the institutionalization of democratic norms led some scholars to proclaim the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). Yet the early twenty-first century has disrupted this optimism. Rather than dramatic coups or abrupt regime changes, the most significant threat to democracy today comes from within through processes of gradual erosion known as democratic backsliding.

Unlike the overt authoritarian takeovers of the Cold War era, contemporary backsliding is often subtle and incremental. Nancy Bermeo (2016) describes this shift as a move from coups to “executive aggrandizement,” in which elected leaders systematically weaken democratic institutions while maintaining a veneer of legality. Courts are packed, electoral rules are rewritten, and independent media are undermined all in the name of representing “the will of the people.”

The cases of Hungary and Poland illustrate this pattern. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government has centralized power, curtailed judicial independence, and reshaped the media landscape, framing these actions as necessary to defend national sovereignty (Bogaards, 2018). Similarly, Poland’s Law and Justice Party has implemented judicial reforms that critics argue undermine the rule of law (Sadurski, 2019). These developments challenge the assumption that democratic institutions, once established, are self-sustaining.

The Populist Logic of Backsliding

Populism plays a central role in contemporary democratic erosion. Defined by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) as a thin-centered ideology that pits a “pure people” against a “corrupt elite,” populism simplifies complex political realities into moral binaries. This framing delegitimizes opposition, weakens pluralism, and justifies the concentration of power.  Digital media has amplified populist dynamics, enabling leaders to bypass traditional gatekeepers and communicate directly with supporters. Platforms designed to maximize engagement often prioritize emotionally charged content, reinforcing polarization and undermining deliberative discourse (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019). In this environment, truth becomes contested, and democratic debate risks devolving into competing narratives rather than shared reasoning. 

Authoritarian Resilience in a Globalized World

While some democracies are weakening, authoritarian regimes have demonstrated remarkable adaptability. Rather than resisting globalization, they have selectively embraced it, combining economic openness with political control. China exemplifies this model, integrating market mechanisms with centralized governance while deploying advanced surveillance technologies to monitor and manage society (Economy, 2018).

Other states, such as Singapore and Rwanda, present variations of developmental authoritarianism, where economic growth and stability are prioritized over political liberalization. These models challenge modernization theories that predict a linear progression from economic development to democracy (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Instead, they suggest that multiple pathways of governance can coexist, complicating assumptions about democracy’s inevitability.

The rise of digital authoritarianism further illustrates how technology can reinforce control. Surveillance systems, facial recognition, and internet censorship enable states to monitor dissent and preempt opposition (Feldstein, 2021). At the same time, democratic governments struggle to regulate powerful technology companies whose platforms shape public discourse across borders.

In this context, the global political landscape is increasingly characterized by hybridity and contestation. Democracy is no longer the uncontested norm but one model among many, facing both internal and external pressures.