6.4.4: At Home and Abroad - Global Insecurity and the War in Ukraine; Why it Matters for Everyone

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Understand how the war in Ukraine has increased global insecurity
• Outline the events that led to the war in Ukraine and understand the developments since it began

 

Introduction

The current war in Ukraine is a good case study of global insecurity. Global insecurity occurs when the security of any individual nation threatens the security of all states. It is the conceptual opposite of global security. The vulnerabilities embodied by occurrences in one or more states do not stay confined to the borders of those countries. Issues such as terrorism, gender-based violence, climate change and environmental deterioration, pollution, economic downturns, nuclear armaments, and criminal activities can become transnational, particularly if they affect large geographies of space and time.

The war in Ukraine is one such issue. The roots of the conflict are deeply embedded in the history of the region. Long before Ukraine was a constituent republic in the Soviet Union, a country dominated by ethnic Russians, it served an important role in the development of Russian identity. The Ukrainian capital, Kyiv (Kiev in Russian), was the heart of the old Kievan Rus state, an important political precursor to the later Slavic state that would become Russia. One of Kiev's famous early leaders, St. Vladimir the Great, baptized the proto-Russian nation into Orthodox Christianity (c. 988), a faith that remains an important part of Russian national identity. During the later expansion of the Russian Empire, large swathes of Ukraine were incorporated into the state, including through the conquests of Ottoman territories, such as the Crimean Peninsula in 1783, and the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1772-1795). What we know today as Ukraine was proclaimed in late 1917 and formally became part of the Soviet Union in 1922, where it remained until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Thus for many Russians, due to this historical and cultural connection, they see Ukraine as an integral part of their country.

Russians also refer to the etymology of the country name, kraj, which means border in Old Slavonic. For Russians, Ukraine was their border. In contrast, many Ukrainians contend that their lands were traditionally outside the Russian mir, or Russian world. Thus, not the border of Russia proper, but bordering Russia instead. Yet, the eastern part of Ukraine, known as the Donbas region, primarily identifies as Russian or Russian-speaking. These areas were the most integrated into the Soviet economy and have felt strongly attached to Russia proper. Two areas within the Donbas, Donetsk and Luhansk, consistently voted for pro-Russian presidential candidates and were least likely to identity as ethnic Ukrainian. Thus, Ukraine has been generally divided into a western Ukraine, centered on the city of Lvov, that saw itself as part of Western Europe, and an eastern Ukraine that focused on Moscow. Ukrainians living in the central part of the country, including the capital city of Kyiv, often incorporated both identities.

How though has this complexity of identity led to war? Part of it can be understood in Cold War terms. Russian president Vladimir Putin has lamented the fall of the Soviet Union, calling it the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in the Twentieth Century. Putin contends that the collapse upended 1,000 years of Russian peoplehood and damaged what he has called ‘historical Russia’ (Osborn and Ostroukh, 2021). In addition, Russian leadership has worried over the expansion of the U.S.-led military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Eastern Europe. Most of the former members of the Warsaw Pact, the military alliance of the Soviet Union and the communist satellite states of Eastern Europe, have joined NATO. The fear was that Ukraine would eventually turn towards the West and request NATO membership as well. As the plains and marshlands of Ukraine have been the traditional path of invasion for Russian foes, such as Sweden during the Great Northern War in the early 1700s, Napoleonic France in the 1810s, and Nazi Germany in the 1940s, Putin has revived the fear that Ukrainian membership into NATO would once again open this path of invasion into Russia. He is combining Russia's emotional connection to Ukraine as an innate part of Russian identity with the specter of a renewed Cold War to promote support for the war.   

 

Figure \(\PageIndex{1}\): 2023 map of NATO membership. Full members of NATO are in dark blue, accession protocol members (Sweden) are in royal blue, membership action plan countries (Bosnia) in lighter blue, and enhanced opportunities partners in the lightest blue. Countries in yellow are part of NATO's individual partnership action plan, whereas countries in orange are in the NATO partnership for peace. (Wikipedia Commons by Chase1493 is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0 Deed)

 

Though the conflict is centered on Eastern Europe, in addition to the potential security threats to Europe, the war in Ukraine has impacted the world in several ways. First, the reverberations of the war extend globally, with blockades on Ukrainian grain exports exacerbating hunger in some of the world's most vulnerable regions. In 2021, Ukrainian grain played a crucial role in providing sustenance for 400 million people globally. However, during the initial five months of the war, Ukraine faced challenges in exporting its grain through the primary shipping routes via the Black Sea. As a result, nations dependent on this grain experienced adverse effects. Numerous grain-receiving countries in the Middle East and Africa, already grappling with hunger crises due to conflict and climate change, were further impacted by the disruption in the Ukrainian grain supply chain.

Second, approximately 5.1 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced, while an additional 6.2 million people have sought refuge primarily in neighboring countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Moldova, though others have been scattered worldwide. Among these nations, Poland has been the most accommodating, hosting nearly 60 percent of all Ukrainian refugees. This accounts for up to 25 percent of Ukraine’s entire population. Third, the conflict in Ukraine has brought attention to the vulnerabilities inherent in just-in-time supply chains, and the economic repercussions of the war have further emphasized the additional risks associated with such a system. While globalization remains resilient, the evolving geopolitical landscape will influence future corporate decision-making. Cost savings will now face more rigorous scrutiny in comparison to risk assessment. The trend towards de-globalization is likely to result in heightened prices, particularly in the short term, contributing to inflationary pressures.

Finally, gasoline prices experienced a significant surge following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. By June 2022, the producer price index (PPI) for gasoline had risen sharply, registering an 85 percent increase compared to the previous year. Ukraine was a transit country for Russian hydrocarbons and the conflict led to Europe shutting down almost 100 percent of their oil and gas imports from Russia. The European Union successfully pivoted to other imported sources of energy and Russia’s attempt to weaponize their energy exports have largely failed to materialize. Yet despite the drop in exports to Europe and the imposition of economic sanctions, Russia has also been able to pivot, selling oil at a discount to major energy consumers, such as China and India.

Prelude to War

In 2013 demonstrations in the capital, Kyiv, against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's choice to reject an agreement for deeper economic integration with the European Union were met with a brutal response from state security forces. The scope of the protest widened to include claims of government corruption, the influence of Russia and human rights abuses. Ultimately in February 2014 President Yanukovych fled the capital and was removed from office by the Ukrainian Parliament. As this was happening, pro-Russian, counter-revolutionary protests began in the eastern and southern portions of the country, including in the peninsula of Crimea.  

In March 2014, exactly one month later, Russian forces invaded and occupied Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin cited the need to protect the rights of Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea and southeast Ukraine as the reason for this military action. In addition, in practical terms, the important Russian naval base of Sevastopol and Russian air base of Simferopol are both located in the region. However, the action did not end once the protection of people and property was secured. Instead Russia formally annexed the peninsula, after Crimeans voted to join the Russian Federation in a disputed local referendum. The crisis heightened ethnic divisions across Ukraine, and two months later, pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk held their own independence referendums.

Almost immediately, armed hostilities erupted in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, pitting Russian-supported groups against Ukrainian military and paramilitary forces. While Russia disavowed any military participation, both Ukraine and NATO documented the accumulation of Russian troops and military hardware near Donetsk, as well as cross-border shelling from Russia shortly after the annexation of Crimea. The conflict subsequently evolved into a tense deadlock, characterized by ongoing artillery fire and clashes along the frontlines dividing the eastern border areas controlled by Russia and Ukraine.

2022 Invasion of Ukraine by Russia

In October 2021, extensive intelligence collection and monitoring of Russian troop movements, force buildup, and military contingency funding led to a White House briefing involving U.S. intelligence, military, and diplomatic leaders. During this briefing, the prospect of a large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine was discussed as highly likely. The primary uncertainties revolved around the timing of the attack and the United States' ability to persuade its allies to take pre-emptive action. Both questions were resolved on February 24, 2022, when Russian forces, following authorization from Russian President Vladimir Putin for a "special military operation," invaded a largely unprepared Ukraine. In his announcement, Putin stated that the objective of the operation was to demilitarize and de-nazify Ukraine and put an end to the alleged genocide of Russians on Ukrainian soil.

In the lead-up to the invasion, the Biden administration took an unconventional approach by loosening restrictions on sharing information and allowing for wider dissemination of intelligence and findings, both with allies, including Ukraine, and the general public. The primary objective of this strategy was to fortify the defenses of allied nations and discourage Russia from pursuing aggressive actions. Evidence from commercial satellite imagery, social media posts, and intelligence reports published in November and December 2021 revealed the movement of armored vehicles, missiles, and other heavy weaponry toward Ukraine, with no official explanation from the Kremlin. By the close of 2021, over one hundred thousand Russian troops were stationed near the Russia-Ukraine border, and U.S. intelligence officials issued warnings about a potential Russian invasion in early 2022.

In mid-December 2021, Russia's foreign ministry called upon the United States and NATO to halt military activities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, commit to refraining from further NATO expansion toward Russia, and prevent Ukraine from joining NATO in the future. The United States and its NATO allies rejected these demands and conveyed their intention to impose significant economic sanctions in response to any aggressive actions by Russia against Ukraine. Early in February 2022, satellite images revealed the most extensive deployment of Russian troops along its border with Belarus since the conclusion of the Cold War. Despite negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and European powers, including France and Germany, a resolution remained elusive. By late February 2022, the United States issued a warning that Russia was poised to invade Ukraine, pointing to the escalating military presence near the Russia-Ukraine border. Subsequently, President Putin directed troops to Luhansk and Donetsk, asserting their role as "peacekeepers." Nonetheless, just before the invasion, U.S. and Ukrainian leaders held contrasting views on the nature and likelihood of a potential armed threat from Russia. Ukrainian officials downplayed the prospect of an incursion, postponing the mobilization of their military forces and reserves.

In addition to moving troops into Luhansk and Donetsk, President Putin also ordered elite airborne forces to seize the capital Kyiv, considered the main prize. Russian forces however failed in their mission. Even though the Ukrainians were woefully outnumbered and were lacking in armaments, the Russians were not expecting such fierce resistance. Russian strategists simply underestimated the political will of the Ukrainian people. In late March 2022, Russia announced that it would “reduce military activity” near Kyiv and Chernihiv. By April 6, Russia had withdrawn all troops from Ukraine’s capital region.

 

Counter-Offensive and Stalemate

In the last months of 2022, Ukraine accomplished several spectacular counter-offensives, with their military forces reclaiming 54 percent of the land once occupied by Russia. This includes thousands of square kilometers north of Kyiv, to the east around the major city of Kharkiv and to the south, recapturing part of the city of Kherson on the western bank of the Dnipro River. The euphoria brought by these victories originally led Ukraine and its Western allies to think that Ukrainian forces might be able to reconquer all of Russian controlled Ukraine, including the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula.

Yet despite the high level of expectations, Ukrainian forces have struggled to recreate their impressive gains in 2023. Russian forces have been able to fortify their territorial gains, greatly frustrating Ukrainian efforts. These fortifications include gun/mortar emplacements, anti-tank barriers, zigzag trench systems, and dragon teeth barriers. Additionally, infrastructure destruction has hampered Ukrainian efforts. In particular, the demolition of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam on June 6, 2023, has had the most impact, profoundly altering the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine. The flooding has made it difficult for heavier equipment, necessary to dislodge entrenched Russian forces, to traverse the terrain near the Dnipro River. As of this writing, it is still unsure if Ukraine will make any more significant territorial gains this year or the next. The stalemate has led to a growing discourse within the domestic politics of the United States and other supporters of Ukraine as to what next steps should be.

While humanitarian crises continue to mount within the borders of Ukraine, the impact of the war also continues to be felt globally. Refugees continue to flee, markets continue to be disrupted and IR theorists that subscribe to both realism and liberal internationalism tell each other, I told you so.