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11.5: Imperfect competition- economies of scope and platforms

  • Page ID
    108420
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    The communications revolution has impacted market structure in modern economies profoundly: it has facilitated economies of scope, meaning that firms may yield more collective profit if merged than if operating independently.

    Economies of Scope

    Imagine an aspiring entrepreneur who envisages a revolution of the traditional taxi sector of the economy. He decides to develop a smartphone application that will match independent income-seeking vehicle owners (drivers) with individuals seeking transport (passengers) from point A to point B. We know how this adventure evolves. In one case it takes the form of the corporation Uber, in another the corporation Lyft, and others worldwide.

    These corporations have grown in leaps and bounds and have taken business from the conventional taxi corporations. As of 2019 they cannot turn a profit, yet the stock market continues to bet upon future success: investors believe that when these corporations evolve into fully integrated multi-product suppliers, both costs will decline and demand will increase for each component of the business. In the case of transportation companies, they aim to become a 'one-stop-shop' for mobility services. Uber is not only a ride-hailing service, it also transports meals through its Uber-eats platform, and is developing the electric scooter and electric bike markets in addition. In some local markets it is linked to public transport services. All of this is being achieved through a single smartphone application. The objective is to simplify movement for persons, by providing multiple options on a variety of transport modes, accessed through a single portal.

    This phenomenon is described in Figure 11.3. The subscripts A and I represent market conditions when the service supplier is operating Alone or in an Integrated corporation. The initial equilibrium is defined by the A demand and cost conditions. The profit maximizing output occurs when img376.png, leading to a price img377.png and a quantity img378.png. Each unit of the good yields a profit margin of img379.png.

    Figure 11.3 Summa's ride hailing service
    img380.png
    Demand for a particular product increases when the autonomous supplier (A) merges with another firm to become an integrated firm (I), because customers switch to firms that offer several different services from the same platform: the demand curve shifts outward, from DA to DI. With integration, the fixed costs fall and average costs fall, even with marginal costs constant. Output and profit increase, and concentration in the marketplace rises.

    This firm now merges with another transportation corporation - perhaps a food delivery service, perhaps an electric bike service. Since each firm has a similar type of fixed cost, these costs can be reduced by the merger. In technical terms, the merged firms, or merged operations, share a common hardware-cum-software platform. Each firm will therefore incur lower average costs, even if marginal costs remain unchanged: the AC curve declines to img381.png. In addition to the decline in average costs, each firm sees an increase in its customer base, because transportation service buyers find it preferable to choose their mode of transport through a single portal rather than through several different modes of access. This is represented by an outward shift in the demand curve for vehicle rides to img382.png.

    The new profit maximizing equilibrium occurs at img383.png Total profit necessarily increases both because average costs have fallen and the number of buyers willing to buy at any price has risen. The analytics in this figure also describe the benefits accruing to the other firm or firms in the merger.

    A platform describes a technology that is common to more than one product in a multi-product organization.

    We conclude from this analysis that, if scope economies are substantial, it may be difficult for stand-alone firms specializing in just one component of the transportation services sector to remain profitable. It may also be impossible to define a conventional equilibrium in this kind of marketplace. This is because some conglomerate firms may have different component producers in their suite of firms. For example, Lyft may not have a food delivery service, but it may have a limousine or bus service. What is critical for an equilibrium is that firms of a particular type, whether they are part of a conglomerate or not, be able to compete with corresponding firms. This means that their cost structure must be similar.

    As a further example: Amazon initially was primarily an on-line book seller. But it expanded to include the sale of other products. And once it became a 'market for everything' the demand side of the market exploded in parallel with the product line, because it becomes easy to shop for 'anything' or even different objects on a single site. Only Walmart, in North America, comes close to being able to compete with Amazon.


    This page titled 11.5: Imperfect competition- economies of scope and platforms is shared under a CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Douglas Curtis and Ian Irvine (Lyryx) via source content that was edited to the style and standards of the LibreTexts platform; a detailed edit history is available upon request.