In §2.1 we noted that when people talk about what a word or phrase “means”, they may have in mind either its dictionary definition or its referent in a particular context. The German logician Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was one of the first people to demonstrate the importance of making this distinction. He used the German term Sinn (English sense) for those aspects of meaning which do not depend on the context of use, the kind of meaning we might look up in a dictionary.
Frege used the term Bedeutung (English denotation)6 for the other sort of meaning, which does depend on the context. The denotation of a referring expression, such as a proper name or definite NP, will normally be its referent. The denotation of a content word (e.g. an adjective, verb, or common noun) is the set of all the things in the current universe of discourse which the word could be used to describe. For example, the denotation of yellow is the set of all yellow things, the denotation of tree is the set of all trees, the denotation of the intransitive verb snore is the set of all creatures that snore, etc. Frege proposed that the denotation of a sentence is its truth value. We will discuss his reasons for making this proposal in Chapter 12; in this section we focus on the denotations of words and phrases.
We have said that denotations are context-dependent. This is not so easy to see in the case of proper names, because they always refer to the same individual. Other referring expressions, however, will refer to different individuals or entities in different contexts. For example, the definite NP the Prime Minister can normally be used to identify a specific individual. Which particular individual is referred to, however, depends on the time and place. The denotation of this phrase in Singapore in 1975 would have been Lee Kuan Yew; in England in 1975 it would have been Harold Wilson; and in England in 1989 it would have been Margaret Thatcher. Similarly, the denotation of phrases like my favorite color or your father will depend on the identity of the speaker and/or addressee.
The denotation of a content word depends on the situation or universe of discourse in which it is used. In our world, the denotation set of talks will include most people, certain mechanical devices (computers, GPS systems, etc.) and (perhaps) some parrots. In Wonderland, as described by Lewis Carroll, it will include playing cards, chess pieces, at least one white rabbit, at least one cat, a dodo bird, etc. In Narnia, as described by C.S. Lewis, it will include beavers, badgers, wolves, some trees, etc.
For each situation, the sense determines a denotation set, and knowing the sense of the word allows speakers to identify the members of this set. When Alice first hears the white rabbit talking, she may be surprised. However, her response would not be, “What is that rabbit doing?” or “Has the meaning of talk changed?” but rather “How can that rabbit be talking?” It is not the language that has changed, but the world. Sense is a fact about the language, denotation is a fact about the world or situation under discussion.
Two expressions that have different senses may still have the same denotation in a particular situation. For example, the phrases the largest land mammal and the African bush elephant refer to the same organism in our present world (early in the 21st century). But in a fictional universe of discourse (e.g., the movie King Kong), or in an earlier time period of our own world (e.g., 30 million BC, when the gigantic Paraceratherium —estimated weight about 20,000 kg— walked the earth), these two phrases could have different denotations. If two expressions can have different denotations in any context, they do not have the same sense.
Such examples demonstrate that two expressions which have different senses may have the same denotation in certain situations. However, two expressions that have the same sense (i.e., synonymous expressions) must always have the same denotation in any possible situation. For example, the phrases my mother-in-law and the mother of my spouse seem to be perfect synonyms (i.e., identical in sense). If this is true, then it will be impossible to find any situation where they would refer to different individuals when spoken by the same (monogamous) speaker under exactly the same conditions.
So, while we have said that we will adopt a primarily “denotational” approach to semantics, this does not mean that we are only interested in denotations, or that we believe that denotation is all there is to meaning. If meaning was just denotation, then phrases like those in (12), which have no referent in our world at the present time, would all either mean the same thing, or be meaningless. But clearly they are not meaningless, and they do not all mean the same thing; they simply fail to refer.
(12) a. the present King of France
b. the largest prime number
c. the diamond as big as the Ritz
d. the unicorn in the garden
Frege’s distinction allows us to see that non-referring expressions like those in (12) may not have a referent, but they do have a sense, and that sense is derived in a predictable way by the normal rules of the language.
6 The term Bedeutung is often translated into English as reference, but this can lead to confusion when dealing with non-referring expressions which nevertheless do have a denotation.
