Now let us consider the apparent polysemy of because. Sweetser (1990: 76–78) suggests that because (and a number of other conjunctions) can be used in three different ways:
Conjunction may be interpreted as applying in one of (at least) three domains [where] the choice of a “correct” interpretation depends not on form, but on a pragmatically motivated choice between viewing the conjoined clauses as representing content units, logical entities, or speech acts. [p. 78]
(8) a. John came back because he loved her. [content domain]
b. John loved her, because he came back. [epistemic domain]
c. What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on. [speech act domain]
The content domain has to do with “real-world causality”; in (8a), John’s love causes him to return. The epistemic domain (8b) has to do with the speaker’s grounds for making the assertion expressed in the main clause: the content of the because clause (he came back) provides evidence for believing the assertion (John loved her) to be true. Sweetser explains the speech act domain (8c) as follows:
[T]he because clause gives the cause of the speech act embodied by the main clause. The reading is something like ‘I ask what you are doing tonight because I want to suggest that we go see this good movie.’ [1990: 77]
Sweetser denies that the three uses above involve different senses of because. Rather, she argues that because has a single sense which can operate on three different levels, or domains, of meaning. She describes this situation, taking a term from Horn (1985), as a case of pragmatic ambiguity; in other words, an ambiguity of usage rather than an ambiguity of sense.
This seems like a very plausible suggestion; but any such proposal needs to account for the fact that the various uses of because are distinguished by a number of real differences, both semantic and structural. The most obvious of these is the presence of pause, or “comma intonation”, between the two clauses. The pause is optional with content domain uses of because, as in (9a), but obligatory with other uses. If the pause is omitted in (9b–c), the sentences can only be interpreted as expressing real-world causality, even though this interpretation is somewhat bizarre. (With the pause, (9b) illustrates an epistemic use while (9c) illustrates a speech act use.)
(9) a. Mary scolded her husband (,) because he forgot their anniversary.
b. Arnold must have sold his Jaguar #(,) because I saw him driving a 1995 minivan.
c. Are you hungry #(,) because there is some pizza in the fridge?
Several of the tests that we used in previous chapters to distinguish truthconditional propositional content from use-conditional meaning also distinguish the content domain use from the other uses of because: questionability, capacity for being negated, and capacity for being embedded within conditional clauses. Let us look first at the interpretation of yes-no questions. When content domain uses of because occur as part of a yes-no question, the causal relationship itself is part of what is being questioned, as in (10a). With other uses, however, the causal relationship is not questioned; the scope of the interrogative force is restricted to the main clause, as in (10b, epistemic) and (10c, speech act). If we try to interpret (10b–c) as questioning the causal relationship (the reading which is required if we omit the pause), we get rather bizarre content domain interpretations.
(10) a. Did Mary scold her husband because he forgot their anniversary?
b. Did Arnold sell his Jaguar, because I just saw him driving a 1995 minivan?
c. Are you going out tonight, because I would like to come and visit you?
We find a similar difference regarding the scope of negation. As noted in §18.2, when a sentence containing a because clause is negated, the negation can be interpreted as taking scope over the whole sentence including the causal relationship. But this is only possible with content domain uses of because, like (11a). With epistemic (11b) or speech act (11c) uses, negation only takes scope over the main clause. Once again, attempting to interpret negation with widest scope in (11b–c) results in bizarre readings involving real-world causality.
(11) a. Arthur didn’t marry Susan because she is rich.
b. You couldn’t have failed phonetics, because you graduated.
c. Mary is not home, because I assume that you really came to see her.
Similarly, content domain uses of because can be embedded within conditional clauses, as seen in (12a); but this is impossible with epistemic (12b) or speech act (12c) uses:
(12) a. If Mary scolded her husband because he forgot their anniversary, they will be back on speaking terms in a few days.
b. ⁇ If Arnold sold his Jaguar because I just saw him driving a 1995 minivan, he is likely to regret it.
c. ⁇ If you are hungry because there is some pizza in the fridge, please help yourself.
Looking back at the differences we have listed so far, we see that in each case the content domain use of because behaves differently from the other two uses, while the epistemic and speech act uses always seem to behave in the same way. In other words, the evidence we have considered up to this point provides solid grounds for distinguishing two uses of because, but not for distinguishing the epistemic and speech act uses.
The evidence we have considered thus far suggests that content domain uses of because contribute to truth-conditional propositional content, while epistemic and speech act uses of because contribute use-conditional meaning. In light of this evidence, we will adopt Sweetser’s suggestion that because has a single sense, treating the different uses as a case of pragmatic ambiguity. However, we will posit just two (rather than three) relevant domains (or dimensions) of meaning: truth-conditional vs. use-conditional.4
In use-conditional functions of because, the conjunction expresses a causal relationship between the proposition expressed by the because clause and the speech act expressed in the main clause, as illustrated in (13b–c).
(13) a. John came back because he loved her. [truth-conditional]
CAUSE(LOVE(j,m), COME_BACK(j))
b. John loved her, because he came back. [use-conditional]
CAUSE(COME_BACK(j), I assert that LOVE(j,m))
c. What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on. [use-conditional]
CAUSE(there’s a good movie on, I ask you what you are doing tonight)
The nature of the causal relationship in use-conditional functions is often closely related to the felicity conditions for the particular speech act involved. One of the felicity conditions for making an assertion is that the speaker should have adequate grounds for believing that the assertion is true. Sweetser’s epistemic because clauses, like the one in (13b), provide evidence which forms all or part of the grounds for the assertion expressed in the main clause.
Sweetser’s speech act because clauses often explain the speaker’s reason for performing the speech act or why it is felicitous in that specific context. The because clause in (13c) explains why the speaker is asking the question, and so provides guidance for the hearer as to what kind of answer will be relevant to the speaker’s purpose.
Two clauses which are joined by use-conditional because behave in some ways like separate speech acts. As illustrated in examples (8c), (9c), and (10b–c) above, a main clause that is followed by a use-conditional because clause can contain a question, even when the because clause itself is an assertion. It is also possible for the main clause to contain a command in this context, as illustrated in (14).5
(14) a. Give me the tickets, because I know that you will forget them somewhere.
b. Take my sandwich, because I know that you have not eaten anything today.
Such examples show that a use-conditional because clause and its main clause can have separate illocutionary forces, and so can constitute distinct speech acts.
4 A number of other authors have made a similar two-way distinction for because clauses, with use-conditional because clauses treated as a type of speech act adverbial; see for example Scheffler (2008; 2013) and Thompson et al. (2007).
5 The fact that the because clauses in these examples start with I know that … blocks any potential interpretion as “content domain” because clauses.
