In this section we introduce the most commonly discussed functions of the conditional construction. As noted above, the standard conditional, illustrated in (2), does not commit the speaker to believing either the antecedent or the consequent to be true, but does seem to commit the speaker to believing that some type of relation exists (often a causal relationship) between the two propositions. Most authors take this to be the most basic usage of if.
(2) standard conditionals
a. If it does not rain, we will eat outside.
b. If the TV Guide is correct, there is a good documentary on PBS tonight.
c. There are biscuits on the sideboard if Bill has not moved them.
d. If you take another step, I’ll knock you down.
e. If Mary’s husband forgets their anniversary (again!), she will never forgive him.
f. If you see George, you should invite him to the party.
The sentences in (3) are examples of relevance conditionals, also known as “biscuit conditionals” because of the famous example listed here as (3a). When the consequent is a statement, as in (3a–d), the relevance conditional seems to commit the speaker to believing the consequent to be true, regardless of whether the antecedent is true or not.3
(3) relevance conditionals (a.k.a. “biscuit conditionals”):
a. There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them. (Austin 1956)
b. PBS will broadcast Die Walküre tonight, if you like Wagner.4
c. If I may say so, you do not look well.
d. He’s not the sharpest knife in the drawer, if you know what I mean.
e. If you went to the office party, how did Susan look?
The replies in (4–5) illustrate factual conditionals.5 Factual conditionals carry the presupposition that someone other than the speaker (often the addressee) believes or has said that the proposition expressed by the antecedent is true.
(4) A. This book that I was assigned to read is really stupid.
B. I haven’t read it, but if it is that stupid you shouldn’t bother with it.
(5) A. My boyfriend Joe is really smart.
B. Oh yeah? If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
The final type that we will mention is the concessive conditional, illustrated in (6). (Small caps are used here to indicate intonation peak.) A speaker who uses a concessive conditional asserts that the consequent is true no matter what, regardless of whether the antecedent is true or false. This is made explicit when, as is often the case, the antecedent is preceded by even if. Notice that the most basic order for concessive conditionals seems to be the opposite of that for standard conditionals, i.e., the consequent comes first. In order for the antecedent to be stated first, it must be marked by even, focal stress, or some other special marker.
(6) Concessive Conditionals
a. I wouldn’t marry you if you were the last man on earth.
b. (Even) if the bridge were standing I wouldn’t cross. (Bennett 1982)
c. I’m going to finish this project (even) if it kills me.
We need to distinguish concessive conditional clauses from concessive adverbial clauses,6 which can be marked with various conjunctions including if. Some examples of concessive adverbial clauses are presented in (7), and examples of concessive adverbial clauses with if in (8).7 This kind of concessive construction commits the speaker to believing that both the antecedent and the consequent are true.
(7) a. Even though the bridge is still standing, I won’t cross it.
b. Although she loves him, she does not plan to marry him.
c. While no one has seen Bigfoot, few people here doubt its existence.
(8) a. It’s all perfectly normal — if troublesome to varying degrees.
b. Virtual colon dissection is promising, if flawed.
c. It was fair and balanced if perhaps a little old.
d. Today hashing is a global, if little known, pursuit.
e. If Eskimos have dozens of words for snow, Germans have as many for bureaucracy. [The Economist, October 11th, 2003, p. 56, col. 2]
f. If Mozart was a life-long admirer of J. C. Bach, his views on Clementi were disparaging, to put it mildly. [OED, citing 1969 Listener 24 Apr. 585/1]
The contrast in truth commitments mentioned above is illustrated in (9). The standard conditional in (9a) does not imply that the speaker believes either the antecedent or the consequent to be true, so denying the consequent does not lead to contradiction or anomaly. The concessive conditional in (9b) and the relevance conditional in (9c) both imply that the speaker believes the consequent to be true, regardless of the truth of the antecedent; so denying the consequent is a contradiction, as indicated by the #.
(9) a. I wouldn’t marry Bill if he were a starving linguist; but as things stand I might end up marrying him (since he is a dentist).
[standard conditional]
b. I wouldn’t marry Bill if he were the last man on earth; #but I suppose I might end up marrying him.
[concessive conditional]
c. If you really want to know, I would never marry Bill; #but I suppose I might end up marrying him.
[relevance conditional]
In the long history of the study of conditionals and their meanings, a variety of additional functions and gradations have been identified and named (often with multiple competing names for the same function, as we have already seen in the case of “relevance” or “biscuit” conditionals). §19.7 below provides some evidence for making a distinction between truth-conditional vs. speech act uses of the conditional form. This is of course the same distinction that we were led to in the previous chapter in our discussion of causation. We will argue that the standard conditionals in (2) involve a truth-conditional usage, whereas the relevance conditionals in (3) involve a speech act usage. The factual and concessive conditionals in (4–6) are harder to classify.
3 This claim has been challenged by some authors.
4 Bennett (2003).
5 These examples are adapted from Bhatt & Pancheva (2006: 671).
6 Thompson et al. (2007).
7 The examples in (8) come from LanguageLog: http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/langu...es/000408.html
