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5.3: Varieties of Non-Democracy

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    Learning Objectives

    By the end of this section, you will be able to:

    • Explain the benefits and drawbacks of typologies.
    • Identify the defining characteristics of types of non-democratic regimes.
    • Recognize past and present empirical examples of non-democratic regimes.

    Introduction

    Given the diversity of non-democratic political regimes, a first attempt at achieving analytical clarity is to devise a typology to categorize non-democracies according to their essential defining features. A typology is a descriptive means to divide a category into sub-categories based on underlying characteristics of items in the category. This section will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using typologies, provide a typology of non-democratic regimes, and introduce examples that correspond with each type of non-democratic regime.

    Typologies

    Creating a typology is an important descriptive exercise. It helps to establish the "lay of the land" and distinguish key characteristics of items within a category. Typologies can be a helpful first step for further analysis. After dividing non-democracies into types A, B, C, and D, for example, a researcher can then ask deeper questions. Which type of non-democratic regime lasts longest, on average? Which type of non-democratic regime tends to fall into conflict or remain at peace for the longest stretch of time? Which type of non-democratic regime enjoys the most economic stability? Do certain types of non-democratic regimes tend to cluster in certain regions of the world?

    When creating a typology to categorize non-democratic regimes, as in Table 5.3.1, the typology is an example of a nominal measure. That is, the items in this typology are not ranked, or ordinal, in relationship to one another. Rather, non-democratic regimes are divided into sub-groups based on certain characteristics, and there is not a hierarchy between the sub-groups.

    In Table 5.3.1, the type of non-democracy depends on two factors: (1) leadership characteristics and (2) common source(s) of legitimacy. The first factor, leadership characteristics, focuses on whether the core leadership within the political regime comprises one or several people and whether all leaders come from a particular institution (e.g., the military, a political party, or a religious group). The second factor, common source(s) of legitimacy, identifies the animating ideas that tend to lend legitimacy to the regime, whether those are traditional, charismatic, or rational-legal forms of legitimacy. As a reminder from Chapter 3.1, traditional legitimacy occurs when states have the authority to lead based on historical precedent; charismatic legitimacy occurs when citizens follow the rules of a state based on the charisma and personality of the current leader; and rational-legal legitimacy occurs when states derive their authority through firmly established laws, rules, regulations, and procedures. 

    Table 5.3.1: Typology of Non-Democracies
    Type of Non-Democracy Leadership Characteristics Common Source(s) of Legitimacy
    theocracy single leader or collective rule (all from a given religious group) traditional
    personalist regime single leader charismatic
    monarchy single leader traditional, rational-legal
    single-party regime collective rule (all from one political party) traditional, rational-legal
    oligarchy collective rule traditional, rational-legal
    military regime single leader or collective rule (all from the military) charismatic, rational-legal
    illiberal regime single leader or collective rule rational-legal

    All typologies present challenges. A first challenge is that, while a typology may work for a certain period of time, it may fail to capture changes over time, such as the emergence of a new political regime type or the expiration of old political regime types. The rise of modern fascist and communist regimes in the 20th century prompted some scholars to argue that a new type of non-democracy, a "totalitarian regime," had arisen. A totalitarian regime is a non-democratic regime that seeks total control over society by a single ruler or group of political elites. To this day, scholars debate whether totalitarianism is a useful term.

    A second challenge is one of fit. Some observations may not slot neatly into the types offered by a given typology. Rather, they may combine characteristics of two or even more types. This kind of combination is observable in the real world of non-democratic regimes, cases that we sometimes label as "hybrids." Hybrid regimes are non-democratic regimes that combine features of more than one type of non-democracy. North Korea, for example, is a "triple hybrid" that has a single-party system led by a personalist leader (from the Kim dynasty) with a politically powerful military. As another example, China under President Xi Jinping may be moving toward a hybrid of personalist and single-party rule. These cases highlight how types within the typology above are not mutually exclusive. A state may fit several types or change types over time.

    Below, we discuss each of the types of non-democracies identified in Table 5.3.1.

    Theocracy

    Theocracies are as old as organized religion. A theocracy is a non-democratic regime in which the authority of political leaders is grounded in a sacred text, a form of traditional legitimacy. These texts provide divine legitimacy to political leaders, and those leaders are not accountable to the public. Within theocracies, political institutions are organized in accordance with prescriptions in a sacred text, such as the executive office, the legal code, and the legal system. Saudi Arabia and Iran are two examples of current theocracies organized around Islam. The Vatican, another theocracy, is organized around Roman Catholicism.

    St. Peter’s Basilica is set in St. Peter’s Square, Vatican City
    Figure \(\PageIndex{1}\): The Holy See, or Vatican City, is a contemporary example of a theocracy. It is governed by Roman Catholic texts and led by a pope. Consecrated in 1626, St. Peter’s Basilica (pictured here) is the largest Christian church in the world. (Source: Facade of St. Peter's Basilica in Vatican City by CIA World Factbook is licensed under Public Domain)

    Personalist Regime and Monarchy

    personalist regime is a non-democratic regime ruled by a single leader. That leader may derive their legitimacy from a variety of sources. These include the personal charisma of that leader or their ability to serve as a convincing interpreter of a political ideology for all of society (charismatic legitimacy). An example of the former is Idi Amin of Uganda (in power from 1971-1979), and an example of the latter is Fidel Castro of Cuba (in power from 1959-2008). Some personalist leaders come to power through family dynasties, such as the al-Assad family in Syria. In all cases, personalist leaders are not subject to formal mechanisms of accountability.

    Personalist rule often relies on strong institutions to maintain a leader's power. For example, a charismatic leader may rely on the organizational heft of a ruling political party or the military to remain in power. Idi Amin was a commander in the Ugandan Army; Fidel Castro led the formidable organizational apparatus of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces.

    Fidel Castro waving next to Che Guevara
    Figure \(\PageIndex{2}\): Fidel Castro was a charismatic leader of Cuba. He is pictured here (right) next to fellow revolutionary Che Guevara. (Source: Che Guevara & Fidel Castro by Alberto Korda Wikipedia is licensed under Public Domain)

    A personalist regime can be more unstable than other types of non-democratic regimes due to problems of succession. A personalist ruler might be hesitant to designate a successor because that successor would then have incentives to depose them from power. At the same time, if a successor is not designated, a leader's death may lead to instability as those remaining vie for political power.

    A monarchy is similar to a personalist regime in that there is a single leader, but the basis of legitimacy tends to be grounded in sacred texts (traditional legitimacy). The Vatican, introduced previously as a theocracy, is also self-described as an "absolute monarchy" because it is led by a pope. The Kingdom of Bahrain is an example of a constitutional monarchy (a combination or traditional and rational-legal legitimacy) that has been led by the Al-Khalifa family since 1783. 

    Highrise buildings and a mosque in downtown Manama, capital of Bahrain
    Figure \(\PageIndex{3}\): High-rise buildings and shopping malls surround a mosque in the capital city of the Kingdom of Bahrain, Manama. (Source: Mosque east of Bab-al-Bahrain via CIA World Factbook is Public Domain)

    Single-Party Regime and Oligarchy

    In contrast to personalist regimes and monarchies, single-party regimes and oligarchies are shaped by collective leadership. Oligarchies are an older form of non-democratic regime. In these systems, elites control political office and national resources and are not accountable to the public for their actions. The Roman Republic was a kind of oligarchy in that only the very wealthy could hold high political office. Political scientist Jeffrey Winters (2011) theorizes that there are two key dimensions to oligarchies: First, the wealth of oligarchs is difficult to seize and disperse and, second, their power extends systemically across the entire regime. In the contemporary world, some point to Russia as subject to a great deal of political influence by oligarchs, though it is not formally an oligarchy.

    The overriding characteristic of a single-party regime is leadership by members of one political party. Prominent examples include the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1917-1991) and the PRI of Mexico (1929-2000). As described earlier in this chapter, the PRI is especially interesting because PRI rule took place in an environment of multi-party competition, but the competition was so skewed in favor of the PRI that Mexico was subject to single-party rule for decades.

    Single-party regimes can be quite stable. For this reason, single-party regimes have been on the rise worldwide since the 1970s. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, over the period 1972 to 2005, non-democracies led by a ruling party increased from 60 percent of all non-democracies to 85 percent.

    Chart of one-party regimes
    Figure \(\PageIndex{4}\): Single-party regimes as a percent of non-democratic regimes over the period 1972-2005 (Data source: Hadenius and Teorell, 2007) (Source: One-Party regimes as a percent of non-democratic regimes, 1972-2005, by Charlotte Lee is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

    Today one of the most powerful countries in the world, the People’s Republic of China, is an example of a single-party regime. Political leadership over the billion-plus people of China resides in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, a body comprising around 20 individuals. Within the Politburo is the Politburo Standing Committee, a body typically comprising between seven and 12 high officials; from this inner group emanate all major decisions guiding contemporary China.

    Military Regime

    A military regime is a non-democratic regime characterized by military elites, rather than civilians, running the government. There are various reasons why militaries rise to political power in a society. One is that they possess the material means--the weapons and organizational capacity--to seize control over a society. On the demand side, a population might support military rule because of popular perceptions of the competence of the military, especially if there are charismatic or well-known generals leading the military. In some cases, the military might appear to be a particularly stable and orderly institution during a time of political turmoil. This in turn may appeal to certain segments of society (such as economic elites, who especially value stability) or entire war-weary societies. The military may therefore enjoy a combination of charismatic and rational-legal legitimacy.

    There exists a continuum for thinking about the role of militaries within a polity. On one end of this continuum, developed democracies are grounded in civilian control of the military. In the example of Canada, the commander-in-chief of the Canadian military is the Canadian monarch. The reverse, total military control over the civilian population, falls on the opposite end of this continuum, and in these non-democratic situations the military is not accountable to the public, even for gross human rights violations. Burma is a prominent example of a country that has been subject to repressive military rule for significant chunks of its post-colonial independence since 1948. The Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw, appeared to allow some liberalization and turn toward civilian leadership during the 2010s, but in the 2020s it again asserted control over the country and its political apparatus.

    Burmese Air Force officers escort a Thai delegation
    Figure \(\PageIndex{5}\): Burmese Defense Services personnel (Air Force) meeting a Thai delegation.(Source: Burmese Defence Services personnel (Air Force) by Thai government via Wikipedia is licensed under CC BY 2.0)

    The number of military regimes rose and fell in frequency during the 20th century. In the post-World War II period, military regimes peaked at 40 percent of all non-democracies, then fell to approximately 15 percent of non-democracies by the turn of the 21st century (Gandhi, 2008).

    Illiberal Regime

    The idea of an illiberal regime, one that exhibits some characteristics of a liberal democracy but is decidedly illiberal in other respects, emerged in the 20th century when it became clear that many aspiring democracies born immediately after the end of the Cold War (between approximately 1989-1991), from Romania to Kazakhstan, were sliding into non-democratic habits. Even more, this seemed to be a trend affecting many young democracies that had emerged earlier in the 20th century.

    An illiberal regime might have multiple political parties, a partially free media, and partially free and fair elections. Institutions that are central to a liberal democracy are, in an illiberal context, weak and subject to manipulation by those with economic power and political influence. In an article exploring the rise of this form of government, Fareed Zakaria (1997, p. 24) observes that, "Far from being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism." In short, illiberal democracies exist in an in-between zone where there are non-democratic institutions or practices in place, yet also some of the common markers of democracy.

    Russia since 1991 is an example of an illiberal democracy, and we will return to this case later in this chapter. To provide a basis for that discussion, we will first discuss democratic backsliding.