Introduction
The central theme of this textbook has been the exploration of comparative politics. Comparative politics is a subfield within political science where the focus is understanding the similarities and differences between cases. For comparative politics, these cases mostly consist of states, or countries as we refer to them in political science. However, as previous chapters have shown, states are no longer the only actor on the international stage. Non-state actors, such as terrorist and criminal organizations have been much more active. International and supranational organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union have taken on more state responsibilities, such as medical provision. Finally, there has been a rising call for greater autonomy within states. Through subnational governments, minority groups have been pressing for more say in their affairs, with some groups seeking outright secession.
Given this increasing complexity, is there still a value of studying comparatively? Are we better off focusing at the global level of analysis? Should we analyze global trends and processes that impact our lives? No one doubts the importance of a global economy in our lives. The global pandemic disrupted global supply chains, causing shortages in products throughout countries. Alternatively, are we possibly better served shifting our attention to within country analysis, where we focus on trends and processes within a country without trying to compare. We see countries fragmenting along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, such as Ethiopia or India. We also see countries struggling with intense politics in the wake of the pandemic, such as the United States and Brazil. By insisting on a comparative framework are we missing out on important context? For example, while the U.S. and Brazil may both be hyperpolarized at this moment, they are clearly two different countries, with two vastly different historical trajectories and outcomes. Given these challenges, is there a value of studying comparatively?
Our direct answer is yes. We think that pressures from above and pressures from below make it even more important for comparative politics to exist and grow as a subfield and area of research. Our main reasoning is that even though more performers have come onto the political stage, the state remains the central actor in this production. When global trends and processes impact us, we often try to understand from our national point of view. We see this with the COVID-19 pandemic, where the responses to the virus have overwhelmingly been managed by individual governments. Even within the European Union, where member-states have given up sovereignty for peace and prosperity, European countries struggled to coordinate their COVID-19 policies. It took quite a bit of time for the European Commission to provide a coherent policy (Goniewicz, et. al. 2020). We also see this when responses to COVID-19 are compared, which is almost always done cross-nationally. Research suggests a bivariate relationship between a country’s Global Health Security Index Score and their death rates. The analysis was completed in June 2020, before the two major waves of 2021 and 2022. Yet even then, the research shows how the state is still considered the main unit of study in comparative work.
This is also true of pressures from below. While COVID-19 has been a global phenomenon, subnational governments, such as U.S. states or Canadian provinces, looked to their national government for policy coordination, funding and political leadership. In federal countries, where power or sovereignty is shared among the national government and subnational governments, the pandemic laid bare the disparities within a country. A good example is India, a federal state with 28 states and 8 union territories. The COVID-19 wave that washed over the country in April and May 2021 shocked the country. Individual states such as Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra were caught off guard for the swift rise in cases. Per the Lancet (2021), the states were “quickly running out of medical oxygen, hospital space, and overwhelming the capacity of cremation sites”. In contrast, other states such as Kerala and Odisha, were better disposed. The Lancet (2021) also notes that the states “have been able to produce enough medical oxygen in this second wave to export it to other states”.
This phenomenon of pressure from above and pressure from below seems at first contradictory. Can the world really be globalizing and fragmenting at the same time? The answer we believe is yes, and that this has been occurring for a while. In the early 1990s, right after the Cold War ended, Barber (1992) alluded to this in his work, Jihad vs. McWorld. He argued that two principles, tribalism and globalism were happening at the same time, and sometimes in the same place. He labeled globalism, McWorld, where a market imperative drives integration and a certain homogeneity. In contrast, he uses the term Jihad for tribalism, using the Arabic word for struggle. In this tendency, Jihad represents the fracturing of societies. Small scale wars instigated by subnational groups seek to redraw boundaries, both internally and externally. Many of these groups seek a state of their own, with the promise of self-determination. Barber notes that neither force is democratic. McWorld requires “order and tranquility” and not necessarily freedom. Whereas Jihad is “grounded in exclusion”. It is parochial by its definition and achieves solidarity through warfare.
These paradoxical forces of globalization and fragmentation have been a recurring discussion in fields such as international relations, international political economy and in international business. However, these forces are less central in the study of comparative politics. The focus on the state as the unit of analysis is most likely the reason. Most comparativists research aspects of the state, such as their regime type, or political economy, or episodes of political violence, including terrorist attacks, and then compare across states. We believe that globalization and fragmentation are integral components of comparative politics. In order to better understand these two forces and their fit in the subfield, we need to define both globalization and fragmentation.
