16.1: Introduction

In the industrially developed countries they run their enterprises with fewer people and with greater efficiency and they know how to do business. All this should be learned well in accordance with our own principles in order to improve our work.
—Mao Zedong, On Contradictions, 1956

They say low wages are a reality
If we want to compete abroad.
—Bob Dylan, “Workingman’s Blues #2”

Job security is under unprecedented threat in many developed nations as a consequence of the mechanization of work.¹ In addition, rising production costs are seeing the relocation of production to low-cost locations. This is a well-known story. Emerging economies are achieving substantial growth by providing cheap labor and preferential investment policies. For China, already an economic powerhouse, a foreign country’s insecurity is their security: the “made in China” phenomenon manifests in products that are designed elsewhere and fabricated in China. Much of this outsourced production involves components. Economists call this “trade-in-tasks,” “unbundling,”² or OEM (original equipment manufacturing).

In this chapter, I attempt to unbundle precarious creativity, a concept that is somewhat ambiguous and misconstrued.³ I look at the relationship between creativity and knowledge capital. Knowledge capital is a currency that is much sought after in the PRC and in some respects overseas players are temporary custodians: the relationship of knowledge capital to “precarious creativity” is therefore worth exploring.

I begin by contextualizing precarity in China’s workforce. Following this, I explore the idea of knowledge. I discuss the distinction between “knowing-that” (propositional knowledge) and “knowing-how” (the acquisition of abilities and skills). I then turn to the question of how knowledge capital and precarious creativity apply to China’s media and cultural industries, specifically animation and television. In the final section, I explain variants of precarious creativity by drawing on a heuristic called the “cultural innovation timeline,” which shows how many policy makers and commentators see the gap between China and its competitors closing. I argue that it is closing because employment is mobile and because knowledge (know-how) is being transferred. But it is also closing because the world is coming to China, not because China is going to the world. In the conclusion, I examine censorship, the “elephant in the room.” The precariousness of expression in China affects all cultural and media workers, Chinese and foreign. Finally, I argue that the value of know-how is augmented by “knowing-to,” a disposition that emanates from cultural and political contexts and constitutes a crucial modality of knowledge capital for persons looking to operate successfully in the Chinese market.