16.7: Concluding Remarks – The (Precarious) Elephant in the Room
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- Michael Keane
- University of California Press
A great deal of government investment has targeted the cultural sector in China over the past decade. As a result of market openings, many foreign players are lining up to take advantage of the “world’s biggest audience.” 49 The technological gap between China and the developed economies is closing fast because of the transfer of knowledge and the movement of human capital.
I have argued that the concept of precarious creativity requires rethinking if it is to apply to China. Of course, the conventional usage of precarity as depicted in much of the literature does apply, especially in manufacturing sectors, where sweatshops operate with impunity. Much work in the creative industries in China is project-based, and we observe a marketplace for talent. In this latter sense, the key point is the mobility of workers in and across media sectors, and from foreign companies back to Chinese digital companies. While many foreign companies are struggling to retain talented workers, the new media challenge is significant, extending to state-owned media enterprises. As suggested by CCTV’s poaching of talent from the independent production sector, even though the work may not be long-lasting, skills are in demand. Conversely, the example of BTV shows that digital media, from games to mobile media, is bent on securing the best “talent” and paying more money.
Despite the massive market for culture in China, government regulation undermines attempts to be taken seriously internationally as a soft power competitor. When competing for the hearts and minds of international audiences, two main challenges confront creators of film, television, and animation content. There are other elements of precarity that stymie China’s outward-bound ambitions. The first is the challenge of credibility. An emphasis on historical revisionism and a propensity toward melodrama, while acceptable in the PRC market, fail to transfer into commercial success abroad. This in turn points to a second problem. There is a lack of understanding within China of how to make content that might be successful overseas and actually assist in reinvigorating “brand China.” 50 Hence the demand for foreign know-how.
Another ubiquitous aspect of precarious creativity is really the “elephant in the room.” What is the point of talking meaningfully about creativity in China if its existence is made perilous by censorship? In this context I want to add another dimension to our understanding of knowledge capital, namely “knowing-to.” Whereas knowing-that and knowing-how provide ways to ascend the cultural innovation timeline, knowing-to comes into play at important times; for instance, a person might wish to push the boundaries of creative work, or a foreign producer might seek to promote a film coproduction in China. Knowing-to becomes an important modality of knowledge capital. Knowing-to manifests in four circumstances: first, anticipating outcomes (understanding the effects of an action or a policy); second, timeliness (making one’s move at the right time); third, context (working in a way that takes account of others’ political obligations and guanxi ); 51 and fourth, “understanding weightiness” (knowing the relative weight of policies and regulations). 52 Knowing-to combined with knowing-that makes for good business in China. However, this does not guarantee good content, just survival.
Finally, it is worth considering how knowing-to applies to the Chinese leadership’s attempt to rebrand China as a “strong cultural power” (wenhua qiangguo) , the latest rhetoric emanating from cultural industry think tanks. In China, precarity extends beyond employment; if someone expresses a view in writing that directly challenges the government or infers that a member of the Chinese political elite is corrupt, this person’s employment may be terminated—and this may have consequences for personal liberty and the welfare of the person’s family. The European Enlightenment view that creativity is about asking difficult questions, challenging authority, and destabilizing norms does not sit well with the government. The discourse of creativity is based on a harmonious vision of progress, captured in the soporific idea of a Chinese Dream, one in which all Chinese citizens are presumed to participate. That means 1.3 billion Chinese dreams. The problem in this rhetoric is that dreaming by definition is difficult to control.