Introduction
How does political violence end? A negotiated settlement leaves the organizational capacity of both sides intact, making a future resumption of war possible (Wagner 1993). On the contrary, a decisive victory of one side implies that the losing side no longer has its capacity to harm while the victor retains the capacity to repress any future mobilization. Consequently, a renewed violence becomes unrealistic for the losing side, keeping the probability of war recurrence low.
Here's an example. Sri Lanka is a nondemocracy, with a history of significant discrimination against non-Buddhist minority groups. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a Tamil militant organization that was based in northeastern Sri Lanka. Its aim was to secure an independent state of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE carried out its first major attack on July 23rd, 1983, also known as Black July, and the start of the Sri Lankan Civil War. For over 25 years, the war caused significant hardships for the population, environment, and economy of the country, with an initial estimated 80,000–100,000 people killed during its course.
In late 2005, the government launched a number of major military offensives, driving the LTTE out of the entire Eastern province of the island. In 2007, the government shifted its offensive to the north, taking control of the entire area previously controlled by the Tamil Tigers, including their de facto capital Kilinochchi, main military base Mullaitivu and the entire A9 highway. This action led the LTTE to finally admit defeat on 17 May 2009. The pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance dropped its demand for a separate state, in favor of a federal solution.
Ending Political Violence
Rebel victories often end in political transformation, with the new regime often embracing democracy, though not always. While rebels often reward the citizens who supported them and their successful challenge, they may also subdue groups within the country that opposed them. As a result, this new government, even if democratic, is likely to pursue repressive policies following the end of the civil war. Ironically, it is these same repressive policies that may have motivated the original conflict in the first place. However, after a civil war ends, repression leads to peace. Remember, if a rebel group wins, its capacity to wage violence is still intact.
Civil wars can end and lead to peace through negotiated settlements. When rebels, insurgents, guerillas, or terrorists disarm, they worry not just about their own safety, but also the needs of the groups they were fighting for. A negotiated settlement often involves the recentralization of power in certain areas where a government reasserts its authority, such as in policing or education. Former rebels are concerned that without their inclusion in the decision-making process, there will be a lack of proper political representation. Thus, minimum safeguards must be in place to protect their interests.
Peacekeeping
Walter (1999, 2002) argues that power-sharing through a negotiated settlement may not be enough. Just because two or more sides agreed to do something, does not mean that they will follow through with it. Thus, there needs to be a third-party guarantor of the settlement. Peacekeeping forces are the best example of a third-party guarantor.
Peacekeeping forces refer “to the deployment of national or, more commonly, multinational forces for the purpose of helping to control and resolve an actual or potential armed conflict between or within states” (Encyclopedia Princetoniensis, n.d.). They can help prevent violence from reoccurring by monitoring the behavior of the former belligerents; and, in some cases, enforcing the agreed-upon provisions. In addition, peacekeepers may help prevent mistakes and miscommunications that could lead to the resumption of violence. Finally, peacekeepers can also prevent the potential abuse of former rebels.
Peacekeeping has been relatively successful since the 1940s, reducing the risk of war recurring by over half! Likewise, it does not seem to make a difference whether the peacekeepers have been invited or imposed (Fortna, 2008).
- Consent-based (traditional) peacekeepers are peacekeepers that have been invited by the belligerents.
- Non-consent or non-invited peacekeeping also occurs. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) imposes a security force in an area, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo during the Yugoslavia Wars of the 1990s.
Peacekeepers are important even when there are strong financial incentives to still fight, such as when lootable resources are involved, such as oil, minerals, and precious metals that can confer wealth on those who own, mine, or transport them.
As part of a post-conflict strategy, peacebuilding efforts are relatively successful because it aims to restructure the political, economic as well as social institutions in a country. This action often includes building stronger institutions, encouraging mass political participation, and promoting respect for societal diversity. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) suggest several other strategies, including addressing local sources of hostility, understanding the local capacity for change, and determining the level of commitment from the international community. Finally, peacebuilding does not necessarily require the use of peacekeepers or a peace enforcement mission. However, the likelihood of success increases greatly when United Nation (UN) peacekeepers are present.
