Sociological Snapshots
Political scientists conceptualize party membership as a long-standing identification that we learn from our families as part of our political socialization. In this view, we don’t act as individuals, researching and evaluating party platforms in terms of our personal interests and ethics. Instead, party membership becomes rooted in history; for example, the impact of the Civil War and the Great Depression shaped the partisanship of subsequent generations through the family transmission of partisanship. The Civil War pushed many northern and western states toward the Republican Party and southern states toward the Democrats. The popularity of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs and leadership during World War II motivated many more Americans to vote Democratic. Then, beginning in the 1960s, many southern whites abandoned the Democratic Party because they opposed the Party’s pro-civil rights policies. Younger southern whites today may not share their parents’ segregationist views, but they have been socialized by where they grew up to become Republicans.
This theory of political socialization lumps people together in various demographic groups who are buffeted by historical forces and pass on political viewpoints to subsequent generations. An alternative approach in political science has supplemented the sociological analysis of party identification, the rational choice theory of politics (Downs), which centers the explanation of party identification on the short-term economic calculations by the voters.
Consider an economic theory of party preference. Begin with the premise that voters have distinct opinions. Parties are vote-seeking organizations that use their party platforms to attract supporters, like businesses seeking customers with advertisements. The voters then support the party that promises their preferred policies. If the party delivers, then they are reelected. Seminal events in American history, such as the Civil War and the Great Depression, fade in importance. Instead, voters focus on their own material success. They ask: which party will help the state economically flourish, reduce crime, provide good schooling, and achieve many other necessary policies? The short-term rational calculus is far more relevant than long-term political socialization.
Considering these two theories, Tables 6.5.1, 6.5.2, 6.5.3, 6.5.4, and 6.5.4 provide some socio-demographic snapshots of California’s two major parties and independents. The numbers for minor parties are just too small for large-scale survey research.
Table \(\PageIndex{1}\): Political Ideology of California Likely Voters in 2020 (Baldassare)
| Political Ideology |
Republicans |
Democrats |
Independents |
| Conservative |
77 |
11 |
31 |
| Moderate |
19 |
28 |
41 |
| Liberal |
4 |
61 |
27 |
Table \(\PageIndex{2}\):Income and California Likely Voters
| Income |
Republicans |
Democrats |
Independents |
| Under 40000 |
22 |
32 |
20 |
| 40000 to 80000 |
29 |
26 |
28 |
| 80000 or more |
49 |
42 |
52 |
Table \(\PageIndex{3}\): Age and California Likely Voters
| Age |
Republicans |
Democrats |
Independents |
| 18 to 34 |
13 |
28 |
20 |
| 35 to 54 |
29 |
29 |
40 |
| 55 and older |
58 |
43 |
41 |
Table \(\PageIndex{4}\): Gender and California Likely Voters
| Gender |
Republicans |
Democrats |
Independents |
| Men |
53 |
41 |
59 |
| Women |
47 |
59 |
41 |
Table \(\PageIndex{5}\): Race/Ethnicity and California Likely Voters
| Race/Ethnicity |
Republicans |
Democrats |
Independents |
| African American |
1 |
9 |
5 |
| Asian American |
10 |
16 |
17 |
| Latino |
13 |
26 |
20 |
| White |
72 |
46 |
54 |
| Other/Multiracial |
3 |
4 |
5 |
The distinctions between Republicans and Democrats are relatively straightforward. Republicans are older and more likely to be white, male, and wealthier than Democrats. These California distinctions parallel national trends. Republicans support their party because of its consistent pro-business platform, emphasizing less regulation and lower taxation. This foundation lies in a nineteenth-century laissez-faire philosophy. Older voters are also more likely to support social conservatism. Historically, Democrats gained more support in California as the working class grew with factory jobs. Then, as the population became more multicultural in the last few decades, Democrats gained more support because of their solid support of civil rights legislation.
We can only draw so many conclusions based on this demographic data. First, many electoral outcomes are caused by short-term factors. For example, we know from voter turnout data that the demographic groups that have historically voted Republican are more likely to vote. So, if turnout surges across the whole voting population, we can expect a shift toward Democrats and independents. Elections are often won at the margins; a change in a few percentage points based on immediate or temporary voter impressions can alter which party controls the government.
Second, what do we know about the 24% of Californians who registered to vote without expressing a party preference? Political scientists know from national studies of voters that people who call themselves independents are “leaners” toward one party or the other regarding their voting behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that a 2018 Public Policy Institute poll found that 43% of California independents leaned toward the Democratic Party, 29% toward the Republican, and only 28% toward neither of the two parties. Independents have an unfavorable view of both parties (58% unfavorable rating of Democrats and 69% unfavorable rating of Republicans). Ideologically, however, their issues stances fall between Democrats and Republicans, expressing more moderate viewpoints on immigration and climate change than Democrats and more liberal views than Republicans (Baldassare).
The presence of one-fourth of the electorate that has little party allegiance leads to some interesting dynamics. First, a candidate must be mindful of these centrist voters to win statewide support. Second, given the independent’s anti-party stance, politics may become quite volatile. Their relative skepticism of established parties may lead to direct democracy campaigns—initiatives, referenda, and recalls—that can catch on like wildfire and overturn the status quo. Third, given the relatively moderate nature of these voters, there may be room for one or the other of the major parties to gain quite a bit more support by heading more toward the center of the spectrum. Or, perhaps even more radically, a new party might develop that seeks to mobilize the center. The top-two primary system and the rules of a recall election, where the contender with the most votes can win once the electorate has rejected the incumbent, may allow savvy candidates to mobilize these moderate independent voters.
It may be wise to consider both the social and individual factors that determine party preferences. As voters, we think about both historical and contemporary issues. In a time of rapid change, a successful party must provide both continuity for voters and a promising path to the future.
For Your Consideration
Think about your political socialization. First, did you grow up in a family where you spoke about politics? If so, how would you characterize the viewpoints that were expressed? Second, has your socialization shaped your preference toward one political party? If so, how? If you really don’t perceive much of a connection between your family and your points of view, how did you arrive at your preference regarding your party identification?
