Skip to main content
Social Sci LibreTexts

3.2: The Modern State and Regime Types

  • Page ID
    135835
  • \( \newcommand{\vecs}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}} } \)

    \( \newcommand{\vecd}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash {#1}}} \)

    \( \newcommand{\dsum}{\displaystyle\sum\limits} \)

    \( \newcommand{\dint}{\displaystyle\int\limits} \)

    \( \newcommand{\dlim}{\displaystyle\lim\limits} \)

    \( \newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\) \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)

    ( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\) \( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\)

    \( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\) \( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\) \( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\)

    \( \newcommand{\inner}[2]{\langle #1, #2 \rangle}\)

    \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\)

    \( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\)

    \( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\)

    \( \newcommand{\inner}[2]{\langle #1, #2 \rangle}\)

    \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\) \( \newcommand{\AA}{\unicode[.8,0]{x212B}}\)

    \( \newcommand{\vectorA}[1]{\vec{#1}}      % arrow\)

    \( \newcommand{\vectorAt}[1]{\vec{\text{#1}}}      % arrow\)

    \( \newcommand{\vectorB}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}} } \)

    \( \newcommand{\vectorC}[1]{\textbf{#1}} \)

    \( \newcommand{\vectorD}[1]{\overrightarrow{#1}} \)

    \( \newcommand{\vectorDt}[1]{\overrightarrow{\text{#1}}} \)

    \( \newcommand{\vectE}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash{\mathbf {#1}}}} \)

    \( \newcommand{\vecs}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}} } \)

    \(\newcommand{\longvect}{\overrightarrow}\)

    \( \newcommand{\vecd}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash {#1}}} \)

    \(\newcommand{\avec}{\mathbf a}\) \(\newcommand{\bvec}{\mathbf b}\) \(\newcommand{\cvec}{\mathbf c}\) \(\newcommand{\dvec}{\mathbf d}\) \(\newcommand{\dtil}{\widetilde{\mathbf d}}\) \(\newcommand{\evec}{\mathbf e}\) \(\newcommand{\fvec}{\mathbf f}\) \(\newcommand{\nvec}{\mathbf n}\) \(\newcommand{\pvec}{\mathbf p}\) \(\newcommand{\qvec}{\mathbf q}\) \(\newcommand{\svec}{\mathbf s}\) \(\newcommand{\tvec}{\mathbf t}\) \(\newcommand{\uvec}{\mathbf u}\) \(\newcommand{\vvec}{\mathbf v}\) \(\newcommand{\wvec}{\mathbf w}\) \(\newcommand{\xvec}{\mathbf x}\) \(\newcommand{\yvec}{\mathbf y}\) \(\newcommand{\zvec}{\mathbf z}\) \(\newcommand{\rvec}{\mathbf r}\) \(\newcommand{\mvec}{\mathbf m}\) \(\newcommand{\zerovec}{\mathbf 0}\) \(\newcommand{\onevec}{\mathbf 1}\) \(\newcommand{\real}{\mathbb R}\) \(\newcommand{\twovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\ctwovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\threevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cthreevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\mattwo}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{rr}#1 \amp #2 \\ #3 \amp #4 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\laspan}[1]{\text{Span}\{#1\}}\) \(\newcommand{\bcal}{\cal B}\) \(\newcommand{\ccal}{\cal C}\) \(\newcommand{\scal}{\cal S}\) \(\newcommand{\wcal}{\cal W}\) \(\newcommand{\ecal}{\cal E}\) \(\newcommand{\coords}[2]{\left\{#1\right\}_{#2}}\) \(\newcommand{\gray}[1]{\color{gray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\lgray}[1]{\color{lightgray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\rank}{\operatorname{rank}}\) \(\newcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\col}{\text{Col}}\) \(\renewcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\nul}{\text{Nul}}\) \(\newcommand{\var}{\text{Var}}\) \(\newcommand{\corr}{\text{corr}}\) \(\newcommand{\len}[1]{\left|#1\right|}\) \(\newcommand{\bbar}{\overline{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bhat}{\widehat{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bperp}{\bvec^\perp}\) \(\newcommand{\xhat}{\widehat{\xvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\vhat}{\widehat{\vvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\uhat}{\widehat{\uvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\what}{\widehat{\wvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\Sighat}{\widehat{\Sigma}}\) \(\newcommand{\lt}{<}\) \(\newcommand{\gt}{>}\) \(\newcommand{\amp}{&}\) \(\definecolor{fillinmathshade}{gray}{0.9}\)
    Learning Objectives

    By the end of this section, you will be able to:

    • Identify the differences between strong and weak states.
    • Compare and contrast examples of political capacity in different states.
    • Define political regime and and identify the difference between democratic and non-democratic regimes.

    Introduction

    The rise of the so-called "modern state" is usually attributed to the end of the European Middle Ages, wherein states were critical to the organization and survival of certain societies. Being a member of a state brought benefits to those included. Having a recognized state meant there was a recognized authority by which states could trade and do business with each other. Trade prompted economic development, which further solidified trading relationships. With economic development, states were able to pursue technological innovations. The advent of trade enabled states to improve the way day-to-day activities were run, and it enabled states to build further military power. Advances in technology helped European states improve engineering, map-making, mathematics, and weapons development. All of these advances contributed to some semblance of political stability for a state's inhabitants. When protected by a recognized, and at least partially unified, state, ordinary people had greater chances for survival.

    As described in the previous section, not all social contracts and state authority are created equal; in fact, there is great variation in the way states manifest in different regions and under different ideological perspectives. This section considers several key factors that comparativists use to compare states.

    State Strength

    The first key factor on which to compare states is state strength. All states grapple with the balance between how much freedom the state will grant its citizens and how much authority the state will wield. This contributes to a variety of political outcomes. Some states are powerful, strong, effective, and stable. Other states are disorganized, chaotic, weak, and unstable. How can we tell the difference between strong and weak states?

    Strong states are those which are able to work their political agendas effectively and to make sure basic political tasks are completed. Strong states are able to defend their territory and interests, collect taxes from their citizens, enforce laws, manage their economies, and promote civil and political stability within their domain. Regardless of where authority is derived, the state has legitimacy to act because the citizens have accepted the terms of the social contract.

    Weak states are those which are unable to perform basic political tasks or complete their political agendas effectively. Weak states are typically unable to defend their territories and interests. They do not have enough legitimacy, or are not institutionalized well enough, to collect taxes, enforce their laws, and/or manage their economies effectively. Weak states may also struggle to ensure domestic stability, likely because they lack the legitimacy and authority to act on their constituents.

    Failed states are those in which the structures of the state are so weak that the state breaks down. A failed, or failing, state does not necessarily imply a situation of anarchy. While a central authority may be unable to effectively control its territory in a failed state, there may remain some semblance of government intact and other societal structures, such as markets, may still function. 

    These definitions of varying state strength rely on the concept of state capacity. Capacity is the ability of a state to use its power, as derived through authority and legitimacy, to get things done and promote its own interests. A state's strength therefore also implicitly relies on our previously-defined term of sovereignty, fundamental governmental power and authority in decision-making within a given territory. A state with low capacity or impediments to its sovereignty is weak; a state with high capacity and no impediments to its sovereignty is strong.

    Political Regime

    The second key factor on which to compare states is political regime. A political regime is the set of rules that structures access to political power within a state, which is usually institutionalized through a state's constitution. A state's political regime has implications for the ways in which a state chooses to wield its power to enforce laws, rules, and norms of political life.

    We typically separate political regimes into two broad types: democracies and non-democracies. A democracy is a political regime in which the supreme power of government is vested in the people. We will discuss democratic institutions, systems of democracy, and democratic consolidation in Chapter 4. A non-democracy is a political regime that denies citizens meaningful institutional channels for making choices about their collective well-being. Non-democracies are often referred to as "dictatorships" or "authoritarian regimes" or "autocracies." We will discuss non-democratic strategies for staying in power, types of non-democracies, and democratic backsliding (toward a non-democratic regime) in Chapter 5.

    As a brief preview and to clarify the differences between democratic and non-democratic regimes, we can compare the ways in which the rules structure access to political power within a state. In a democracy, rulers come to power through free and fair elections; in a non-democracy, rulers do not come to power through free and fair elections.

    As one example of a non-democracy, we can consider a personalist regime, a type of political regime in which power lies with a single, charismatic, and all powerful person who drives all actions of the state (typically referred to as a "dictator"). While non-democracies can range in the extent to which the state intervenes in the private lives of citizens, most non-democracies do not permit independent media or protect civil liberties like freedom of speech and association. A current example of a personalist regime is North Korea.

    The current Supreme Leader of North Korea is Kim Jong-Un, who has served since 2011. Kim Jong-Un took over the title of Supreme Leader after the death of his father, Kim Jong-Il. Similarly, Kim Jong-Il took over the title of Supreme Leader in 1994 after the death of his father, Kim Il-Sung. The people of North Korea do not elect their Supreme Leader; rather, the method to access political power is through dynastic succession (i.e., power is passed down within the Kim family). The state's legitimacy therefore relies on charismatic legitimacy stemming from the Kim family, which enjoys a cult of personality. A cult of personality occurs when a state leverages all aspects of a leader’s real and exaggerated traits to solidify the leader’s power. In North Korea, the media promotes propaganda to endow its leader with divine-like status.

    Kim Jong-un
    Figure \(\PageIndex{1}\): Image of Kim Jong-Un, Supreme Leader of North Korea, in 2019. (Source: Kim Jong-un, by Alexei Nikolsky is licensed under CC-BY 4.0)

    As a second example of a non-democracy, we can consider a military regime, a type of political regime characterized by military elites, rather than civilians, running the government. This small group of military leaders is called a junta. Similar to the personalist regime example, within a military regime led by a junta, the leaders do not come to power through elections. In many cases, rather, a junta initially forms as resistance to or rebellion against an existing government, then gains power through a military-led coup d'état. A coup d'état (often simply called "coup") is an attempt to abruptly, unlawfully, and sometimes violently seize power from an existing government. In Myanmar in 2021, for instance, the military (Tatmadaw) seized control, overthrowing a democratically-elected government. After a parliamentary election in November 2020 that resulted in a decrease in the number of military-aligned political party seats, Myanmar's military alleged election fraud and requested that the government delay the opening session of parliament. The government rejected this request and, in response, the military seized power, detained those who had won the election, declared a state of emergency, and handed control of all branches of government to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing as junta leader (with the official title of Chairman of the State Administration Council).

    In each of the two examples above, the commonality that distinguishes non-democratic from democratic regimes is that rulers come to power through means other than free and fair elections.

    It is important to note that political regimes are not fixed. A political regime transition occurs when there is a change in political regime (e.g., from democracy to non-democracy, from non-democracy to democracy, or from one type of non-democracy to another).

    Consider the example of the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany during the 1920s. Following World War I, a weak democracy was installed in Germany called the Weimar Republic, but the state suffered from a number of problems. The terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty that formally ended World War I, put Germany into dire social and economic straits. Germany was forced to pay high reparations, which left the German people impoverished. High unemployment, high inflation, and general discontent made it difficult for the Weimar Republic to enforce its political agenda. In the midst of these circumstances, Hitler crafted a cult of personality to rally many Germans against the Weimar Republic. Through his use of manipulation and incendiary speech, Hitler was appointed as Chancellor of Germany in 1933. He (and the Nazi Party) effectively abolished the Weimar Constitution through decrees and laws that consolidated his power while eroding the rights and liberties of the German people, turning Germany into a non-democratic regime. At the end of World War II, and after Hitler's death, Germany experienced another regime transition, but this time from non-democracy to democracy.

    While comparativists study regime transitions, regime types, and state strength, they also study states by considering many aspects of political institutions, political and cultural identity, political economy, and political violence. We will discuss these topics in detail in subsequent chapters.