4.4: Democratic Consolidation

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Define democratic consolidation.
• Identify characteristics of democratic consolidation.
• Recognize theories of democratic consolidation.

Introduction

As a reminder from Chapter 3, a political regime transition occurs when a state experiences a change in its political regime, the set of rules that structures access to political power. Democratization is a political regime transition in which a state moves from a non-democratic regime to a democratic regime. After democratization occurs, states embark on democratic consolidation, a process in which new democracies evolve from fledgling democratic regimes to established, stable, and secure democratic regimes. Through this process, democracy becomes recognized as "the only game in town," with the state exhibiting strong and high-quality democratic institutions. These strong institutions reduce the state's risk of reverting to a non-democratic regime.

Scholars expect consolidated democracies to endure, but how can they tell when a democracy moves from fledgling to established status? What are the indicators of a consolidated democracy?

Two potential indicators of democratic consolidation are the "two-election test" and the "longevity test." The two-election test, also known as the "transfer of power test," asserts that a democracy becomes consolidated when a government that was elected through free and fair elections (election #1) is subsequently defeated (election #2), and all sides accept the election outcome. This test judges democratic consolidation by the peaceful transfer of power. One problem with using this test as an indicator of democratic consolidation is that some states have dominant party systems in which the same political party is elected to office repeatedly. Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), for example, has been in power almost continuously since its founding in 1955, and it was in power continuously for nearly four decades, from 1955-1993. Yet even in 1992, Freedom House ranked Japan as a "free" regime. It is difficult to imagine arguing that Japan was not a consolidated democracy prior to the 1993 election.

The second potential indicator of democratic consolidation is the longevity test, which asserts that a democracy becomes consolidated after it holds free, fair, and regular elections for an extended period of time (e.g., for more than two decades). Yet this test also has problems. If elections are held over time, yet those elections benefit only one party, the longevity test may not be a good indicator of democratic consolidation. Persistent elections do not necessarily indicate a high quality of democracy.

The problems with these two tests demonstrate that it can be difficult to identify indicators for consolidated democracy. Below, we briefly consider three theories related to the likelihood of democratic consolidation (note that this is an incomplete list; scholars have proposed many more than three theories on this topic).

Theories of Democratic Consolidation

Theory 1: The regime type that existed prior to the democracy will affect whether a state reaches consolidated democracy status.

This theory posits that some types of non-democratic regimes are, following a regime transition, more likely to lead to consolidated democracies than others. If a non-democratic regime, for example, held partially free or fair elections, or if that regime allowed for any institutions that were representative of the people, these pre-existing conditions may increase the likelihood of democratic consolidation following democratization. Alternatively, if the prior non-democratic regime centered leadership in a military junta, this may decrease the likelihood of democratic consolidation following democratization due to an increased likelihood of military interference in the new regime. 

Theory 2: The type of political regime transition will affect whether a state reaches consolidated democracy status.

This theory questions whether the circumstances under which democratization occurs within a state matter. According to Huntington and Linz (1991), who (or what group) initiates the transition toward democracy helps to determine the likelihood of democratic consolidation. If external forces impose a transition to democracy (e.g., by overthrowing an existing dictator), the outsider-led rupture may make democratic consolidation less likely; if groups within the society initiate a transition to democracy (e.g., by protesting against the existing regime), this insider-led rupture may make democratic consolidation more likely.

Theory 3: The likelihood of democratic consolidation increases with economic development.

This theory argues that a state with a free market system is more likely to experience democratic consolidation, and economic growth acts as a catalyst for democratic consolidation. As Beethem (1994, pp. 164-165) describes:

"… a market economy disperses decisional and other forms of power from the state. This serves the cause of democracy in a number of ways: it facilitates the development of an autonomous sphere of 'civil society' which is not beholden to the state for resources, information or organisational capacities; it restricts the power and scope of a bureaucratic apparatus; and it reduces what is at stake in the electoral process by separating the competition for economic and political power into different spheres."

If a state shows a willingness to promote a free market with fair competition, it also shows that it is willing to loosen its grasp on an institution that it could otherwise control. By choosing not to control all market outcomes, the state is more likely to experience economic growth. And, the more that the economy improves, the more citizens within a state can experience prosperity and engage in political life, promoting democratic consolidation.

While these three theories give broad insight into factors that may promote or hinder democratic consolidation, in the following section, we compare the process of democratization and evaluate democratic consolidation across two specific cases: Iraq and South Africa. These two cases will elucidate a number of other factors that we must consider in studying the likelihood of democratic consolidation, such as historical context, political culture, identity politics, class structures, economic structures, and political institutions.