11.3: Non-state political violence

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the different types of non-state political violence
• Understand the differences between civil wars, insurgencies, and guerilla warfare
• Apply explanations of terrorism
• Evaluate what is a revolution

Introduction

As we stated earlier, a non-state actor is a political actor not associated with a government. Non State actors come in many different types, from transnational corporations to nongovernmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, to international drug trafficking rings. Yet there are quite a few non-state actors who engage in political violence, from guerillas to insurgents to terrorists. Generally speaking, non-state political violence is by the type of action, rather than the type of actor. This is because the non-state actors can all engage in different types of political violence. For example, terrorists can participate in insurgencies and/or civil wars, whereas guerillas can engage in terrorist actions.

Insurgencies/Civil Wars

In the simplest term, a civil war (simple) is an armed conflict between two or more groups where one of the combatants is the government. Does this mean then that an armed engagement between a street gang and a police unit constitutes a civil war? The answer would be no. Even though the media may use terms such as war or civil war to describe such violence, political scientists would not refer to it as either war or a civil war. Remember, political violence is defined as the use of physical harm is motivated by political intentions. Given this, political violence scholars have narrowed the definition of the term.

According to Sambanis (2004), to meet the definition of civil war (political science), a conflict must be between a rebel group and the government who are politically and militarily organized with stated political objectives that take place in the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of at least 500,000. In addition to these general requirements, there are additional critical characteristics in distinguishing civil wars from the rest of armed engagement. The violence cannot be one-sided (see the section below on terrorism), and there needs to be sustained violence.

What then distinguishes civil war from other types of violence (e.g., riots, terrorism, and coup d’etat)? First, civil wars are notated for the level of destruction. Wars within a country are often devastating. The US civil war killed over 600,000 people. Its scars are still felt in the US till this day. Given this, most scholars have adopted a numerical threshold of 1,000 deaths when defining political violence as the Correlates of War project as the one of the main deciding factors in determining whether an armed conflict should be classified as a war. While the use of numerical threshold can be useful in determining whether a violent episode is a civil war or not, strict application of that threshold can exclude cases that otherwise meet the definition of civil war.

Given the power dynamics involved in civil wars, the weaker-side (typically the rebels) often rely on certain techniques when challenging the government. This reliance on insurgency tactics is what characterizes a civil war. An insurgency is an act of uprising or revolt against a government and/or the state. It is closely related to the concept of a rebellion, which we will define below. Insurgents claim that they represent the will of the people against a government that no longer represents them. For many insurgents then, their ultimate goal is the overthrow of the government, which in that case makes them revolutionaries (discussed more below). For other insurgents, their state goal may be secession, or if secession is not an attainable goal, then some level of political autonomy.

Insurgents use particular tactics because of the power imbalance that they face against the state. Even in a situation where the state is facing extinction as a functioning political entity, the state still often has the overwhelming firepower. This follows what we discussed earlier, where part of the definition of a state is that it monopolizes the legitimate use of violence. As such, the challenging side needs to be creative and innovative when challenging the government since the insurgent’s probability of success is much lower, especially in head to head combat.

Guerilla warfare is similar to insurgency, and often the phrases are interchangeable. Like terrorism and insurgency, guerilla warfare is also better understood as a tactic, where small, lightly armed bands engage in guerrilla warfare from a rural base that targets the state. Guerilla warfare differs from insurgency in that these fighters usually do not engage in mass mobilization practices. Insurgents claim to represent the will of people. Guerillas do not. They tend to represent the interests of certain groups, and not necessarily the entire population. Of course, these definitions overlap and using the terms interchangeably happens in all settings.

What causes civil wars? Earlier literature on the onset of civil wars focused on grievances. The grievance explanation says that political violence along communal lines is jointly a product of deep-seated grievances about the status of the group and the situationally motivated political interests that various political actors desire to pursue (Gurr, 1993). Grievances often revolve around economic, social, and political rights, as well as demand for political autonomy. These grievances contribute to the likelihood of communal mobilization, which can lead to political violence.

This is especially more likely when a group historically has some level of political autonomy and then loses it. Resentment about the restriction on one's political access appears to drive rebellion amongst various communal groups. Rebellion is an act of violently challenging the government or existing ruler in order to bring attention to the status quo with which the challengers are dissatisfied. In this context, the sentiments of grievance can help leaders of the disadvantaged communal group. They can point to this instance as a basis in legitimizing their cause and propelling the movement. Given this, as the level of grievances increases within a group, the easier it becomes for leaders to recruit potential rebels. In turn, this can lead to rebellion and civil war.

The grievance explanation has been challenged by a number of scholars. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) prefer to look at opportunity factors for rebellion instead of motivational factors. They see rebellion as an industry that generates profit from exercising control over resources. They argue that “the incidents of rebellion are not explained by motive, but by the atypical circumstances that generate profitable opportunity” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). More specifically, factors associated with the cost of and the availability of financing the rebellion, relative military advantage of the potential rebel group, and the patter of demographic dispersion are all considered robust indicators of whether rebellion is an attractive option for opportunistic actors. In addition, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that rebellion is most likely when participants have low incomes. In their model, they incorporate measures of per capita income, the rate of male secondary school enrollment, and the economic growth rate. The basic idea is that if joining the rebel movement appears to be more profitable for the individuals, then it incentivizes the desire to participate, which in turn determines if a rebellion remains viable.

Finally, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that civil war is understood through favorable environments. They disagree with theories that place emphasis on the necessity of strong, widespread popular support based on factors associated with grievances. Instead, they argue that an insurgency can be viable and sustained under certain conditions: mountainous terrain, contiguous crossborder sanctuaries, and an easily recruited population. These conditions favor insurgents given the asymmetric distribution of power between the rebels and government forces.

Non-State Terrorism

Again, terrorism is defined as a violent act that generally targets noncombatants for political purposes. Many non-scientific analyses of various terrorism cases often cite religion, ethno-racial factors, extreme political ideology as the primary motivation for extreme groups to resort to violence. Many make a causal link between these factors and the outcome of a terrorist act by political extreme groups. However, it is evident that mere membership in a particular religious or ethnic group is not always causing one to commit these violent acts. So when and why do political extreme groups commit violence?

In the literature on the origins of terrorism, there are two dominant schools of theoretical explanation: psychological and rational choice explanations. The psychological explanation of terrorism relies on the idea that the violence itself is the desired outcome as opposed to being the means to the end. Post (1990) claims that “individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.” While Post recognizes that this is a rather extreme claim, the psychological explanation posits that an act of violence is rationalized by the core ideology of a terrorist group where the participants are psychologically compelled to commit acts of violence.

Conversely, scholars like Crenshaw (1990) rely on the rational choice explanation of terrorism where the use of terrorism is believed to be the result of a willful strategy based on a careful political calculation. In this framework, terrorism is understood as an expression of political strategy where the act of violence is amongst many alternatives from which an extreme group may choose. Simply put, when the expected benefit of a terrorist act outweighs the const of such behavior and produces the highest expected utility, then such an act becomes the most strategically sound option for a group. This analytical approach follows the conventional explanations for terrorism that a relatively weak group relies on a policy choice to make it hard for the state to ignore their claims.

For example, if the US armed forces were to go head to head with an existing terrorist groups, it is clear that the U.S. would easily defeat them. As a result, it makes no sense for a terrorist group to fight the US conventionally. Instead, it is preferable to strike the US where it is most vulnerable - targeting noncombatant targets, such as civilians. When looking back at the September 11th, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, we see that al-Qaeda’s main target was the World Trade Center, the financial nerve center of the country. Military targets, such as the Pentagon, were also hit, but the goal of the attacks were to punish the American people, and put pressure on the US government to change their foreign policy and international behavior. If we were to use the rational choice explanation of terrorism, then the 9/11 attacks were not committed by an irrational group of extremists, but as a group engaged in a willful strategy to accomplish a political outcome. Indeed, it would be counterproductive to label them as “irrational” as that could lead to an underestimation of another attack.

The evidence is mixed in terms regarding the effectiveness of non-state terrorism. Terrorist action can lead to a specific change in government policy, but there have been few notable overall shifts in foreign policy. For example, al-Qaeda bombed several train stations in Madrid in 2004 as a reaction to the Spanish government involvement in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The attacks took place right before national elections and they influenced how Spanish citizens voted. Once the new government came in, they withdrew Spanish forces from coalition fighting in Iraq. However, the attacks in Madrid did not change the overall Iraq War. Other countries refused to change course.

Figure \(\PageIndex{1}\): (Source: Remains of one of the trains bombed in the 2004 Madrid train bombings by Ramon Peco via Wikimedia Commons is licensed under CC BY 2.0)

Terrorist action can also lead to changes in government policy that were not intended by the group. For example, the 9/11 attackers did not intentionally desire to change airport policies in the US. However, as anyone who has traveled in the past twenty years knows, the attacks had a dramatic impact. Now, all travelers in the US have to endure more intrusive safety protocols, including x-rays, taking off one’s shoes, opening up carry-on bags, prohibition of liquids, etc. Prior to these attacks, most anyone could enter an airport, without as much intrusion. For example, people were able to go through security without a ticket and walk their loved ones to the gate. Similarly, they could wait at the gate when welcoming back their loved ones. These privileges no longer exist.

On other hand, sometimes the state purposes of a terrorist organization fail completely. A good example includes the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) call for the creation of a caliphate. A caliphate is essentially a state run by Islamic political authorities. A caliphate has not existed for quite a few centuries. ISIS leaders, who claimed to represent the interests of all Muslims worldwide, desired to build a caliphate in the areas of Syria and Iraq that they had conquered. A caliph is believes to be the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad, which is an important concept in the history of Islam. Yet despite the best efforts of ISIS, the caliphate did not last. Syrian, Russian, Kurdish and American forces largely defeated ISIS in 2019. Even though ISIS committed atrocious violence and killed many non-combatants, they ultimately failed to achieve their primary political goal.

So how do we protect ourselves from a potential terrorist attack? Most countries develop counterterrorism policies, especially those that have been targeted in the past or are actively targeted today. Counterterrorism policies are defined as government or military efforts to prevent or thwart terrorism. Examples of counterterrorism policies include the U.S. government’s efforts to cut off terrorist financing. This is accomplished by monitoring incoming and outgoing financial transactions, such as wire transfers and bank deposits. Other examples include extensive background checks for international student visas and retinal and fingerprint scans at border checkpoints. Another good example involves the EU’s efforts to deradicalize convicted terrorists. They have developed a Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). According to the European Commission, “The RAN is a network of frontline practitioners who work daily with both those vulnerable to radicalization and those who have already been radicalised.” (European Commission, n.d.)

Revolution

The term revolution has been used in a variety of contexts. For example journalists will label news where a group of citizens politically (and often violently) protest and challenge the government in power as a revolution. An example includes current pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Certain media outlets have labeled these protests as a revolution. Even the participants of the protest have used the word revolution in their slogan, “Liberate Hong Kong, the Revolution of Our Times.” While journalists can use the word revolution, generally speaking describing the struggle as a revolution may not be appropriate. As mentioned in Chapter 2, political scientists need to clearly define the terms prior to making descriptive or causal inferences about the event of their interest. Otherwise, any potential politically violence action can be called a revolution.

According to Skocpol (1979), a revolution is defined as a public seizure of the state in order to overturn the existing government and regime. This definition has three important parts. First, there has to be public participation in the movement. This means that the public must play a critical role. This characteristic of a revolution differentiates it from other types of political violence such as a coup d’etat. Recall from Chapter Three, that a coup d’etat is an attempt by elites to overthrow the current government of a state through abrupt seizure of power and removal of the government’s leadership. While many political challenges and violence are initiated by political elites, a revolution must be supported by the general public.

Second, the main purpose of a revolution is the public seizure of the state. Other types of political violence may not require the seizure of the state. Some politically violent actors can achieve their goals with concessions from the state. For example, some insurgents may settle for an expansion of voting rights or meaningful protection of civil rights. Or, some terrorists may settle for a change in policy. A revolution in contrast will end with the rebel group in control of the state apparatus, taking full control over the function of the government.

Third, once the state is captured by the rebels, there will be a shift in the regime. This characteristic is critical when attempting to differentiate a revolution from all other types of political violence against the state. Without regime change, such actions are classified under other types of political violence (e.g., civil war). It is very important to be able to clearly identify whether a particular event constitutes a revolution or not when studying the onset, nature, and possible solution to political violence. While violent episodes may initially appear to be the same in terms of the cause, researchers are most likely to observe differences in the duration or the nature of violence between revolution and non-revolutions.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 is a great example of a revolution as described by Skocpol. It marked the end of centuries of imperial Russian rule, with the assassination of the Romanov family in 1918. The ensuing civil war saw the communists, or Bolsheviks, fight under Vladimir Lenin. Their red army fought against the white army, a loose association of loyalists, capitalists and other elements. The success of the communists in 1923 led to a dramatic reordering of Russian society. A largely agrarian society was collectively industrialized in the ensuing decades. New social norms were introduced. It was truly a revolution in every sense of the word.

The above discussion generally discusses a revolution accomplished through violent means. However, in some cases revolutions may occur without violence. Quite a few nonviolence movements have succeeded in achieving regime change. Nonviolence movements are defined as movements that engage in nonviolent practices to accomplish political goals. Tactics can include protests, boycotts, sit-ins, and civil disobedience. They are also referred to as nonviolent resistance or nonviolent protests. All three elements identified by Skocpol need to exist: public participation, public seizure of a state, and a shift in regimes. Where nonviolent revolutions differ is that the movement’s leaders convince the state’s military, or some portion thereof, that the state is better off under a new regime. It is not a coup per se, as a coup is led by military elites. In nonviolent revolutions, the military either refuses to intervene, and/or abandons the regime in power entirely. When that happens, the reigning military authority will work with the new regime to maintain peace and security.

A great example of a nonviolent revolution is the fall communist regimes in 1989. The Soviet Union installed loyal regimes in Eastern European countries in the aftermath of World War II. As part of the Warsaw Pact, countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany were satellite states, dependent on the Soviet Union for their legitimacy and survival. When popular uprisings would occur, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet forces rolled in, quelling any hopes of democracy. When popular uprisings occurred again in 1989, Soviet forces withdrew this time, allowing the puppet communist regimes to collapse. Eastern Europe quickly adopted democratic capitalist models. Little violence occurred, with the exception of the execution of Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania.