11.4: How Does Political Violence End? Post-Conflict Strategies

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Understand how political violence can end
• Analyze what are negotiated settlements
• Evaluate the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking

Introduction

How does political violence end? Various arguments have made that the way in which political violence ends will determine if it happens again. Let’s use civil wars as an example. In general, civil wars that end in a negotiated settlement have a higher chance of experiencing a renewed war in relation to the wars that end in a decisive victory (Wagner 1993; Licklider 1995). This is due to the fact that a negotiated settlement leaves the organizational capacity of both sides intact, making a future resumption of a war possible (Wagner 1993). On the contrary, a decisive victory of one side implies that the losing side no longer has its capacity to harm while the victor retains the capacity to repress any future mobilization. Consequently, a renewed violence becomes unrealistic for the losing side, keeping the probability of war recurrence at low.

A good example involves the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in the country of Sri Lanka. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a Tamil militant organization that was based in northeastern Sri Lanka. Its aim was to secure an independent state of Tamil Eelam in the north and east in response to the state policies of successive Sri Lankan governments towards Tamils. The LTTE carried out its first major attack on July 23rd, 1983, which led to what is referred to as Black July, the common name used to refer to the anti-Tamil pogrom and riots in Sri Lanka. Black July is generally seen as the start of the Sri Lankan Civil War between the Tamil militants and the government of Sri Lanka.
For over 25 years, the war caused significant hardships for the population, environment and the economy of the country, with an initial estimated 80,000–100,000 people killed during its course. Sri Lanka is a nondemocracy, with a history of significant discrimination against non-Buddhist minority groups. Its authoritarian government was able to carry out quite repressive policies to defeat the separatist movement.

In late 2005 and the conflict began to escalate until the government launched a number of major military offensives against the LTTE beginning in July 2006, driving the LTTE out of the entire Eastern province of the island. In 2007, the government shifted its offensive to the north of the country, the government took control of the entire area previously controlled by the Tamil Tigers, including their de facto capital Kilinochchi, main military base Mullaitivu and the entire A9 highway, leading the LTTE to finally admit defeat on 17 May 2009. Following the LTTE's defeat, pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance dropped its demand for a separate state, in favor of a federal solution

The Sri Lankan government was accused of massive war crimes violations against its own citizens.

Toft (2009) argues that civil wars that end in rebel victory are likely to produce enduring peace, but not in the way one expects. Rebel victories often end in political transformation, with the new regime often embracing democracy, though not always. Still, even if the rebel group adopts a democratic regime, it does not mean that they will abstain from repression. Remember, if a rebel group wins, then this means that their capacity to wage violence is still intact. While rebels often reward the citizens who supported them and their successful challenge, they may also subdue groups within the country that opposed them. As a result, this new government, even if democratic, is likely to pursue repressive policies following the end of the civil war. Ironically, it is these same repressive policies that may have motivated the original conflict in the first place. However, after a civil war ends, repression leads to peace

Another way that civil wars can end and lead to peace are through negotiated settlements. Negotiated settlements are defined as successful discussions between combatants where an agreement is reached to end political violence. Hartzell (1999) argues that the key to the enduring peace settlement requires the institutionalization of certain power-sharing mechanisms. When rebels, insurgents, guerillas or terrorists disarm, they worry not just about their own safety, but also regarding the needs of the groups they were fighting for. A negotiated settlement often involves the recentralization of power in certain areas. This is where a government reasserts its authority, such as policing or education. Former rebels are concerned that without their inclusion in the decision-making process, there will be a lack of proper political representation. This could also lead to less access to economic opportunities. For these folks to lay down their weapons, at minimum safeguards must be in place to protect their interests, at best they need to be part of the solution.

Walter (1999, 2002) argues that power-sharing through a negotiated settlement may not be enough. Just because two or more sides agreed to do something, does not mean that they will follow through with it. There has to be a way to make sure that these negotiated settlements can be enforced. The simplest way to do this is through a third-party guarantor. A third-party guarantor is defined as an external force that can enforce the provisions of a negotiated settlement. Walter shows that the implementation of power-sharing agreement in itself is not sufficient in producing an enduring peace. This is due to the fact that a durable negotiated settlement requires not only short-term security concerns, but also long-term political problems that the post-war environment may produce.

Peacekeeping forces are the best example of a third-party guarantor. Peacekeeping forces refer “to the deployment of national or, more commonly, multinational forces for the purpose of helping to control and resolve an actual or potential armed conflict between or within states” (Encyclopedia Princetoniensis, n.d.). Peacekeepers generally contribute to the durability of peace established through negotiated settlements. In a post-conflict environment peacekeepers facilitate an environment where self-sustaining peace is possible. This is true even after the peacekeepers have departed. Peacekeepers can help prevent violence from re-occuring through monitoring the behavior of the former belligerents, and in some cases enforcement of the agreed upon provisions. They also help prevent mistakes and miscommunications that could lead to resumption of violence. Increased communication can dampen the effect of spoilers, or disaffected individuals who may disagree with a negotiated settlement and prefer political violence to peace. Finally, peacekeepers can also prevent potential abuse of former rebels.

Peacekeeping has been relatively successful since it began back in the 1940s. A conservative estimate suggests that peacekeepers reduced the risk of war recurring by over half! Likewise, it does not seem to make a difference whether the peacekeepers have been invited or imposed (Fortna, 2008). Consent-based (traditional) peacekeepers are peacekeepers that have been invited by the belligerents. Peace enforcement missions occur when consent is not required or peacekeeping forces were not invited by the belligerents. This happens when an outside organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) imposes a security force in an area. This happened in Bosnia and in Kosovo during the Yugoslavia Wars of the 1990s. Finally, peacekeepers are important even when there are strong financial incentives to still fight, such as when lootable resources are involved. Lootable resources are defined as accessible natural resources, such as oil, minerals and precious metals that can confer wealth on those who own, mine or transport them.

Peacebuilding is also an important aspect of a post-conflict strategy. Peacebuilding is defined as the implementation of structures to promote sustainable peace. Peacebuilding efforts are relatively successful because it aims to restructure the political, economic as well as social institutions in a country. This often includes building stronger institutions, encouraging mass political participation, and promoting respect for societal diversity. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also suggest that a successful peacebuilding strategy needs to address several items. These include addressing local sources of hostility, understanding the local capacity for change, and determining the level of commitment from the international community. Finally, peacebuilding does not necessarily require the use of peacekeepers or a peace enforcement mission. However, the likelihood of success increases greatly when UN peacekeepers are present.