11.5: Comparative Case Study - Conflict Termination - Bangladesh and Turkey

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Understand how low-intensity conflict can contribute to a resumption of fulls-cale conflict
• Distinguish the differences between indiscriminate and selective violence
• Explain how changes in counterinsurgency strategy affects the outcome of a conflict

Introduction

Given the potential brutality and destructiveness of political violence, there is an assumption that all involved parties would have an incentive to maintain peace. This assumption is even more understood after an especially violent episode, such as a civil war. However, evidence shows that political violence reoccurs and that civil wars have an ever higher than expected reoccurrence rate. As with any conflict, there is usually some low-level violence that will persist for a while. However, the presence of low-intensity violence does not necessarily mean that political violence will happen again. A Low-intensity conflict (LIC) is defined as a level of hostilities or use of military power that falls short of a full‐scale conventional or general war (encyclopedia.com). Given this, understanding when political violence reoccurs is important. More specifically, let’s look at what factors transform a low-intensity conflict into full-scale conflict, such as civil war.

One way of understanding when political violence reoccurs is through the post-conflict dynamics. Specifically, how the government treats the former rebels matters. Government actions can either incentivize or disincentivize an insurgency. When ordinary individuals believe they are unable to remain neutral, or government action threatens their personal security, there is a greater likelihood of a renewed war. For the insurgents, inaction could be more detrimental to their personal or community’s well-being. To better understand this dynamic, we will compare two cases. The first case involves the relationship between the Jummas (Hills people) and the Bangladeshi government. The second case examines the relationship between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish government during their long-running civil war.

We relied on Mill’s Method of Difference (most similar systems) approach given the similarity between the two cases. This includes the compared past history and the wartime dynamics. The dependent variable is a recurrence of political violence. The independent variable is the post-conflict dynamics, also understood as the causal mechanism. These dynamics varied greatly. While the Turkish government heavily employed indiscriminate violence, the Bangladeshi government was more selective when using violence to counter insurgents. Indiscriminate violence is defined as the use of violence that is random in nature. It is this difference that makes these two conflicts an ideal pair for comparative case analysis.

As mentioned, these conflicts were quite similar in their characteristics. Their similarity stems from a conflict between the government and a minority ethnic group. Both minority groups originally sought secession as a solution for discriminatory treatment, such as the denial of their distinct identity within their respective societies. Each government mistreated their respective ethnic minority, as part of their nation-building process. Each country sought to forcibly assimilate their minorities and ignore cultural differences. Even without active opposition, the Kurds in Turkey and the Jummas in Bangladesh suffered from severe political, social and economic exclusionary policies and practices. During periods of unrest, both the Bangladeshi and Turkish governments relied on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, usually claiming that they were countering an insurgency.

The PKK Case: Turkey and the Kurdish Insurgency

• Full Country Name: Republic of Türkiye
• Head(s) of State: President
• Government: Unitary Presidential Constitutional Republic
• Official Languages: Turkish
• Economic System: Free Market Economy
• Location: Eastern Europe
• Capital: Ankara
• Total land size: 302,455 sq. miles
• Population: 84 million (July 2021 est.)
• GDP: $692 billion
• GDP per capita: $8,080
• Currency: Turkish Lira

In the Turkish case, we explore the continuing conflict between the government forces and the Kurds. The Kurds are an ethnic group, speaking a Indo-Iranian language, native to the mountainous region of Kurdistan. Kurdistan is not an independent state. Instead, the population is dispersed among four countries: Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Kurdish groups have gained a level of self-government in Iraq and Syria, both after following devastating civil wars. The Kurds in Iraq rule what’s called Iraqi Kurdistan, which is de jure, or formally recognized by the Iraqi government. The Kurds in Syria rule in Rojava Kurdistan, or simply Rojava. Their autonomy is de facto, or unrecognized by the Syrian government.

For Kurds in Turkey, their interests have historically been represented by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK is the name of the Kurdish insurgency movement in Southwestern Turkey. This conflict illustrates how the continued use of indiscriminate violence, such as torture, kidnappings, disappearance and summary executions, provided a strong incentive for Kurds to support the PKK. A milestone in the war came with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. Many thought that his arrest, and the statement he made after his arrest, served as symbolic that the war had ended. Öcalan publicly announced that a reliance on violence in resolving the Kurdish struggle was a mistake. He also endorsed that the PKK seek a non-violent political solution. He ordered high-ranking PKK officers to surrender as well, of which 16 individuals associated with the PKK turned themselves in. The capture of Öcalan coincided with a growing sense of war fatigue among ordinary Kurds. Kuridh public opinion supported Öcalan’s endorsement of a nonviolent approach. Combined, these two factors saw PKK violence decline dramatically. In turn, Turkish government reprisals also declined. For the first time in many decades, the Kurdish region of Turkey experienced a period of relative calm.

The decrease in violence did not mean that tension faded. Public demonstrations still took place, especially over mistreatment. This sometimes led to violent clashes between the two sides, which led to a resumption of political violence just a decade later. This time around, rather than just focusing on Kurdish actors, the Turkish government also targeted noncombatant villagers, mostly women and children (Yildiz, 2005; Yildiz & Breau, 2010). This is a means of deterrence and has unfortunately become common practice in southeastern Turkey. The government has essentially reverted back to its reprisals before the capture of Öcalan.

The persistence of indiscriminate violence against the Kurdish minority, and Kurish noncombatants has shaped the narrative of the overall conflict. For many, the capture of Öcalan meant the end of the insurgency. However, the postwar period saw continued physical threats. Kurds were targeted even when someone desired to remain neutral. Many Kurds still rely on the PKK to help them absorb the brunt of government violence. In sum, the post-conflict environment, where Turkish government reprisals have continued, have motivated Kurds to support the rebel cause, eventually leading to a resumption of political violence.

The Chittagong Hills Tract Case: Bangladesh and Jummas (Hill people)

• Full Country Name: People’s Republic of Bangladesh
• Head(s) of State: President
• Government: Unitary Dominant-Party parliamentary republic
• Official Languages: Bengali
• Economic System: Developing market economy
• Location: South Asia
• Capital: Dhaka
• Total land size: 57,320 sq. miles
• Population: 161,376,708
• GDP: $1.11 trillion
• GDP per capita: $6,633
• Currency: Taka

In the Bangladesh case, many of the conditions that exist in the Turkey case are mirrored. For example, there was an armed rebellion between the Bangladesh government and the Jummas. The Jummas, or hill people, are a group of ethnically distinct tribes living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area. This area is in the northeast of the country, bordering India and Myanmar. Jumma is a collective name, which is derived from a particular farming method these groups employ - Jum, which is cultivation of crops through a slash and burn method. Just like Turkey, Bangladesh attempted to forcefully and violently assimilate all minority groups. This prompted armed challenges from members who faced oppression.

Yet unlike Turkey, the conflict in Bangladesh ended differently. Originally, the government of Bangladesh also relied on the use of intimidation and coercion regarding the Jummas. The noncombatant population was also gravely affected through indiscriminate violence. It was a change in attitude and government policy towards the Jumma that made peace possible. In 1983, the government of Bangladesh offered general amnesty to all of the Shanti Bahini insurgents, one of the main Jumma groups fighting the government. About 3,000 rebels accepted this deal and surrendered. It took more than ten years to fully achieve a peaceful resolution.

The change in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy clearly produced a different outcome than in Turkey. Counterinsurgency is defined as a government’s efforts to reduce and/or mitigate political violence instigated by insurgents. Counterinsurgency tactics can include use of indiscriminate violence, which is what happened in Turkey, or can be nonviolent. In Bangladesh, the government used selective violence, which is when a government only targets active participants in the war and/or those who commit political violence. As such, ordinary Hill people could stay neutral. They did not feel compelled to fight back as they were no longer threatened with indiscriminate violence.

The Bangladesh case portrays how the commitment of the government of Bangladesh and the tribal people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in finding a political solution to the civil war produced a successful negotiated settlement that is still in effect to this date despite some lingering issues. The counterinsurgency strategy focused on the process of deliberation and transparency, coupled with a tremendous reduction in the use of force. This allowed for a relative period of peace to emerge and set the state for a series of peace negotiations that ultimately culminated in the Chittagong Hill Tract Peace Accord of 1997.